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NOTE
United States v. Wilson: Did Interstate General Substantially
Affect Interstate Commerce?
Following the decision of the Supreme Court in United States v.
Lopez,' commentators were quick to analyze its impact on federal
law and the direction of the Court.2 This scrutiny is not surprising
given that Lopez marked the first occasion in nearly sixty years that
the Court struck down a federal statute as beyond congressional
power under the Commerce Clause. Given that much of this
century's important legislation-ranging from agricultural laws to the
Civil Rights Acts-was passed under the constitutional authority of
the Commerce Clause,4 many observers believe that a number of
these laws are now vulnerable to constitutional challenge.' One area
of particular concern is environmental legislation.6 Prior to Lopez, it
was taken for granted that environmental legislation was well within
Congress's commerce power.' Since Lopez, however, there is
1. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). In Lopez, the Supreme Court struck down the Gun-Free
School Zones Act of 1990, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (1988 & Supp. V 1993), as beyond the
constitutional limits of Congress's commerce power. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551; infra
notes 174-214 and accompanying text (discussing Lopez).
2. See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending After Lopez, 95 COLUM.
L. REV. 1911 (1995); Charles Fried, Foreword. Revolutions?, 109 HARV. L. REV. 13, 34-
45 (1995); Donald H. Regan, How to Think About the Federal Commerce Power and
Incidentally Rewrite United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 554 (1995).
3. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
4. See Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L.
REV. 1387, 1387 (1987).
5. Compare Stephen M. Johnson, United States v. Lopez: A Misstep, but Hardly
Epochal for Federal Environmental Regulation, 5 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 33, 69-74, 79-82
(1996) (enumerating justifications for the constitutionality of the Clean Water Act and
the Endangered Species Act), with Richard A. Epstein, Constitutional Faith and the
Commerce Clause, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 167, 190 (1996) (calling for a return to pre-
1937 Commerce Clause jurisprudence).
6. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 5, at 41-42 (speculating that Lopez "may have
added another arrow to the quiver of ... opponents of federal [environmental]
regulation"); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Biodiversity and Land, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 77
(1997) (discussing the possibility that Lopez will lead to a "fundamental rethinking" of
the commerce power and its potential impact on the direct regulation of land use under
federal environmental laws); Lori J. Warner, The Potential Impact of United States v.
Lopez on Environmental Regulation, 7 DUKE ENvTL. L. & POL'Y F. 321,321 (1997).
7. See Daniel A. Farber, Environmental Federalism in a Global Economy, 83 VA. L.
REV. 1283,1307-09 (1997).
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uncertainty about the limits of Congress's commerce power to pass
regulations to protect the environment.' Seizing on this uncertainty,
challenges are beginning to mount against environmental legislation
such as the Clean Water Act ("the Act").' The Act's jurisdiction
over wetlands may be particularly vulnerable after Lopez because, in
many cases, implementation of the Act is based on somewhat
attenuated connections to interstate commerce.10
Like many defendants charged with federal crimes and facing
trial after Lopez, the defendants in United States v. Wilson" saw
Lopez as an invitation to raise one more challenge to their
convictions on appeal.12 Specifically, the Wilson defendants argued
that by adopting the "other waters" provision as part of a regulation
defining the extent of jurisdiction of the section 404 permit program
of the Act," the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (the "Corps") had
exceeded the bounds of the Commerce Clause because the "other
8. In particular, absent a substantial connection to interstate commerce, it is not
clear to what extent Congress may regulate private land use, traditionally an area of state
concern. See Karkkainen, supra note 6, at 75-78; see also John P. Dwyer, The Commerce
Clause and the Limits of Congressional Authority to Regulate the Environment, 25 Envtl.
L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,408 (Aug. 1995) (singling out the Endangered Species Act and
the Safe Drinking Water Act for possible vulnerability to constitutional challenge).
9. 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251-1387 (West 1986 & Supp. 1998); see infra notes 88-94 and
accompanying text (describing the functions of the Act).
10. See Johnson, supra note 5, at 66-67; Warner, supra note 6, at 343-55.
11. 133 F.3d 251 (4th Cir. 1997).
12. Since the Lopez decision, the Fourth Circuit has heard several Commerce Clause
challenges to a variety of federal statutes. See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. &
State Univ., 132 F.3d 949 (4th Cir. 1997), vacated, reh'g en banc granted (Feb. 5, 1998)
(upholding Title III of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 13981
(1994)); United States v. Hartsell, 127 F.3d 343 (4th Cir. 1997) (upholding the Clean
Water Act), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1321 (1998); Hoffman v. Hunt, 126 F.3d 575 (4th Cir.)
(upholding the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act, 18 U.S.C. § 248(a)(1) (1994)),
cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1838 (1997); United States v. Crump, 120 F.3d 462 (4th Cir. 1997)
(upholding federal firearms statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g), 924(c)(1) (1994)); United States
v. Johnson, 114 F.3d 476 (4th Cir.) (upholding the Child Support Recovery Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 228 (1994 & Supp. 1996)), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 258 (1997); United States v. Bailey,
112 F.3d 758 (4th Cir.) (upholding Title II of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994,
18 U.S.C. § 2261(a) (1994)), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 240 (1997); United States v. Wells, 98
F.3d 808 (4th Cir. 1996) (upholding federal firearms statute, 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(g) (West
1976 & Supp. 1998)); United States v. Leshuk, 65 F.3d 1105 (4th Cir. 1995) (upholding the
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)
(1994)). The circuit courts of appeals decided over 35 cases presenting Lopez challenges
in 1995 alone. See The Lopez Watch, ADMiN. & REG. L. NEWS, Winter 1996, at 4. By
December 1995, approximately eight months after Lopez, the district and circuit courts
had addressed over 80 Commerce Clause challenges to federal criminal statutes. See
Andrew Weis, Note, Commerce Clause in the Cross-Hairs: The Use of Lopez-Based
Motions to Challenge the Constitutionality of Federal Criminal Statutes, 48 STAN. L. REV.
1431, 1432 (1996).
13. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1994).
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waters" provision does not require that the waters covered by the Act
have a sufficient connection to interstate commerce. 14 Unlike many
other defendants raising such Commerce Clause challenges, however,
the defendants in Wilson were successful. 15
This Note first describes the facts and holding of United States v.
Wilson in the context of the relevant parts of the Act, including the
§ 404 permit program and the regulations promulgated thereunder. 6
A brief history of the commerce power is then recounted, 7
culminating in a lengthier discussion of United States v. Lopez." The
impact of Lopez in federal courts of appeals is summarized with
respect to treatment of jurisdiction under the Act and the "other
waters" provision.19 The Note then analyzes how the current
Supreme Court might address these jurisdictional issues in light of
Lopez.20 Finally, assuming that the "other waters" provision may be
constitutionally problematic, changes to the provision are explored in
addition to alternative bases for jurisdiction over wetlands such as
those at issue in Wilson.
21
Defendants James J. Wilson, Interstate General Company
("Interstate General"), and St. Charles Associates were convicted at
trial on four felony counts of knowingly discharging fill material and
excavated dirt into wetlands" on four parcels of land without a
permit in violation of §§ 1311(a) and 1319(c)(2)(A) of the Act.23
14. See Wilson, 133 F.3d at 255.
15. All such challenges raised in the Fourth Circuit were unsuccessful. See supra note
12 (listing the challenges).
16. See infra notes 22-136 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 137-73 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 174-214 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 215-64 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 265-342 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 343-66 and accompanying text.
22. The Corps defines wetlands as "areas that are inundated or saturated by surface
or ground water at frequency and duration sufficient to support, and that under normal
circumstances do support, a prevalence of vegetation typically adapted for life in
saturated soil conditions." 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(b) (1997). See generally Lawrence R.
Liebesman, The Section 404 Dredged and Fill Material Discharge Permit Program, in THE
CLEAN WATER ACr HANDBOOK 136, 138-41 (Parthenia B. Evans ed., 1994) (discussing
wetlands delineation manuals); James J.S. Johnson & William L. Logan, III, How an
Uncodified Appropriations Act Has Partially Cured a Constitutional Problem About How
Wetlands Are Defined for Federal Regulatory Purposes, 13 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J.
173 (1994) (discussing difficulties in defining wetlands); James J.S. Johnson et al., Bogged
Down Trying to Define Federal Wetlands, 2 TEx. WEsLEYAN L. REv. 481 (1996) (same).
For a history of wetlands regulation, see Sam Kalen, Commerce to Conservation: The Call
for a National Water Policy and the Evolution of Federal Jurisdiction over Wetlands, 69
N.D. L. REV. 873 (1993).
23. See 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251-1387 (West 1986 & Supp. 1998); Wilson, 133 F.3d at 254.
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Wilson was an experienced developer, having worked more than
thirty years in the field.24 He was the chief executive officer and
chairman of the board of directors of Interstate General, a publicly
traded land development company with assets of over $100 million. z5
Interstate General, in turn, was the general partner of St. Charles
Associates, a limited partnership that owned the land at issue in
Wilson.26
The charges related to excavation activities by the defendants in
.conjunction with the development of St. Charles, a planned
community situated between the Potomac River and Chesapeake
Bay in Charles County, Maryland. 27 At the time of the Wilson
decision, St. Charles consisted of 4000 developed acres and 10,000
housing units inhabited by 33,000 residents3 s At completion, it is
expected to encompass 9100 acres with 80,000 residents.29  The
community was formed under the New Communities Act of 1968,30
and the initial development was performed by a partnership between
the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development
("HUD") and Interstate General.3 1 As part of the agreement,
seventy-five acres of wetlands near a swamp were to be preserved.32
At issue were four parcels of land located more than ten miles from
the Chesapeake Bay, more than six miles from the Potomac River,
and hundreds of yards from the nearest creeks.33 Additionally, these
parcels were not pristine wilderness areas situated adjacent to
already developed lots.34
The defendants attempted to make these parcels suitable for
construction by digging ditches using a type of excavation known as
"sidecasting 35 to drain water from these parcels and dumping fill
material on the land.36 Both of these methods proved unsuccessful.37
24. See Wilson, 133 F.3d at 254.
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. See id.
29. See id.
30. New Communities Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448, 82 Stat. 513 (repealed 1983).
This statute's purpose was to "facilitat[e] the enlistment of private capital in new
community development." Id. at 513.
31. See Wilson, 133 F.3d at 254.
32. See id.
33. See id. at 257.
34. See id. at 254.
35. Sidecasting is a process whereby a ditch is excavated and the removed soil is
deposited next to the ditch. See infra note 60.
36. See Wilson, 133 F.3d at 254-55.
37. See id. at 255.
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Engaging in these activities on wetlands required a permit pursuant
to § 404 of the Act.38  Defendants did not obtain the necessary
permits and were consequently charged with criminal violations of
the Act.39
At trial, the government introduced evidence that the parcels in
question contained wetlands, including testimony and photographs of
substantial standing water, reports of vegetation typical of hydrologic
soils, and infrared aerial photographs displaying a pattern of streams
under the vegetation.4° Furthermore, maps of public record, such as
the National Wetlands Inventory Map and topographical maps of
Charles County and the State of Maryland, identified these parcels as
containing wetlands.4' The government also demonstrated that water
from these areas flowed in a drainage pattern of ditches, creeks, and
streams that ultimately emptied into the Potomac River.42
The government presented evidence that the defendants knew
these lands were wetlands.43 The very activities that formed the basis
for prosecution in this case were attempts to drain the land to make
construction possible.4 Substantial fill was added in an attempt to
raise the ground level of these parcels.' Because the ground was so
wet, there were problems with the ground shifting and collapsing.
46
Bids for work on the property explicitly contained different prices for
wet and dry work.47 The government also presented testimony that
despite the efforts to dry out the land, including the addition of
hundreds of truckloads of stone, gravel, and other fill, wetland-loving
plants continued to sprout through the fill.' 8 Furthermore, a private
consulting firm retained by the defendants concluded that the parcels
contained wetlands and urged the defendants to seek permits from
the Corps prior to developing the parcels. 49 Defendants also were
warned by local zoning authorities about the potential presence of
wetlands near the development.50 Finally, even after the Corps issued
38. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1994); infra notes 95-103 and accompanying text.
39. See Wilson, 133 F.3d at 254.
40. See id.
41. See id.
42. See id. at 254-55.
43. See id. at 255.
44. See id.
45. See id. Fill was added to three of the four parcels. Only ditches were dug on the
fourth parcel. See id. at 254.
46. See id. at 255.
47. See id.
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. See id.
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an order to halt construction on one of the parcels, defendants
continued to develop the other parcels without notifying the Corps or
seeking a permit. 1
In their defense, defendants argued that the Corps acted
inconsistently and indecisively by taking action on only one parcel,
despite the fact that the Corps knew of development on all four
parcels. 2  The defendants also introduced an internal Corps
memorandum stating that the Corps was unsure whether it had
jurisdiction over the wetlands because the parcels might not be
"waters of the United States" within the purview of the Act. 3
Defendants also argued that they had legally drained the parcels
before adding the fill, and thus no violation of the Act had occurred.54
Nevertheless, the defendants were convicted of discharging fill
material into a wetland without a permit-a violation of § 1311(a) of
the Act.5 Furthermore, defendants were found to have been aware
that the parcels were wetlands, resulting in convictions of "knowing"
violations of the Act,56 which carry significantly more stringent
penalties than mere negligent violations.5 7 Wilson was sentenced to
twenty-one months imprisonment with one year supervised release
and fined one million dollars.58 St. Charles Associates and Interstate
General were together fined three million dollars and placed on five
years probation.5 9
Defendants appealed to the Fourth Circuit on several grounds,
including a challenge to the authority of § 328.3(a)(3) of the Act's
51. See id.
52- See id.
53. Id. The Act prohibits discharges of pollutants into "navigable waters." See 33
U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1362(12) (1994). The Act defines "navigable waters" as "waters of the
United States." Id. at § 1362(12). Exactly what Congress intended this latter term to
encompass is an enigma, however. The Corps defines it in its regulations. See 33 C.F.R.
§ 328.3(c) (1997). See infra note 130 (quoting the regulation); see also infra notes 112-28
and accompanying text (explaining the dynamics of the Act and the jurisdictional
regulations promulgated thereunder).
54. See Wilson, 133 F.3d at 255; see also Save Our Community v. U.S. EPA, 971 F.2d
1155, 1163-66 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that the plain language of the Clean Water Act
requires a § 404 permit only when there is a discharge, so drainage of wetlands in and of
itself does not require a permit).
55. See Wilson, 133 F.3d at 254.
56. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2) (1994) (providing for fines of up to $50,000 and
imprisonment of up to three years); Wilson, 133 F.3d at 254-55. Another important issue
raised in the Wilson opinion is the nature of mens rea required to constitute a "knowing"
violation of the Act. See infra note 60.
57. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1) (providing for fines of up to $25,000 and imprisonment
of up to one year).
58. See Wilson, 133 F.3d at 254.
59. See id.
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implementing regulations6° (the " 'other waters' provision"), which
the government argued extended jurisdiction of the Act to the four
parcels in question.61  Defendants argued that the definition of
60. See 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3) (1997). In addition to challenging the validity of the
"other waters" provision, defendants challenged the district court's application of the Act
to "wetlands that do not have a 'direct or indirect surface connection to other waters of
the United States.'" See Wilson, 133 F.3d at 257-58; infra note 61. For a list of what
"waters" are "waters of the United States," see infra note 130.
Defendants also challenged whether "sidecasting" actually constituted a violation of
the Act. See Wilson, 133 F.3d at 258. Defendants argued that sidecasting in a wetland
without introducing additional fill material did not constitute a violation of the Act since
it is not a "discharge" under the meaning of § 1362(12) of the Act. See id. at 258-59.
Judge Niemeyer agreed with the defendants' argument. Id. at 260. However, Judge
Luttig concurred in the judgment only, and Judge Payne dissented from this view. See id.
at 266 (Luttig, J., concurring); id. (Payne, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Thus, the Fourth Circuit's stance on this issue is not entirely clear. Incidental fallback
from excavation activities has been held not to constitute the addition of fill material and
hence not a "discharge" under the Act. See National Mining Ass'n v. U.S. Army Corps of
Eng'rs, 145 F.3d 1399, 1404 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (holding that incidental fallback is a "net
withdrawal" and not an addition of material). For a contrary interpretation, see
Avoyelles Sportsman's League, Inc. v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897, 923 (5th Cir. 1983) (holding
that the redeposit of soil into wetlands is a "discharge" under § 1362(12) of the Act).
Furthermore, defendants challenged the district court's instructions to the jury
regarding the mens rea necessary to constitute felony violations of the Act. See Wilson,
133 F.3d at 260-65. The Fourth Circuit unanimously found that the district court's jury
instructions did not require the appropriate level of knowledge with respect to each
element of the offense. See id. at 264-65. Among other things, the Fourth Circuit
indicated that the prosecution must demonstrate that defendants knew both the physical
characteristics of their property that made it a wetland and the required facts that
connected the wetland to waters of the United States. See id. at 264. The level of mens
rea necessary is an important issue, but is beyond the scope of this Note. For a more
thorough discussion of this issue, see Christine L. Wettach, Mens Rea and the "Heightened
Criminal Liability" Imposed on Violators of the Clean Water Act, 15 STAN. ENVTL. L.J.
377, 387-89 (1996) (discussing the knowing standard in the Clean Water Act). See
generally Richard J. Lazarus, Assimilating Environmental Protection into Legal Rules and
the Problem with Environmental Crime, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 867, 881-82 (1994)
(discussing problems of intent in environmental crimes); R. Christopher Locke,
Environmental Crimes: The Absence of "Intent" and the Complexities of Compliance, 16
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 311, 321-25 (1991) (discussing the less strict intent requirements in
prosecuting environmental cases). For a survey of environmental crime, see generally
Sandee Blabolil et al., Environmental Crimes, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 491 (1997).
Finally, defendants also raised some issues regarding evidentiary rulings and
sentencing, but these points were held to be moot in light of the Fourth Circuit's
disposition of the other aspects of the appeal, a disposition requiring a new trial. See
Wilson, 133 F.3d at 265-66.
61. See Wilson, 133 F.3d at 255. Jurisdiction also was founded on these wetlands
being "adjacent wetlands" as defined by § 328.3(a)(7). See id. at 257. Defendants
challenged this finding, as well as the corresponding jury instructions, on the grounds that
the jury instructions indicated that jurisdiction would be proper despite the fact that no
finding of a "direct or indirect surface connection" to other waters of the United States
was required. See Wilson, 133 F.3d at 257-58. The Fourth Circuit's stance is not clear
because, like the sidecasting issue, Judge Luttig concurred in the judgment only and Judge
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"waters of the United States" set forth in § 328.3(a)(3) exceeded not
only the bounds of the Act but also-based on the Supreme Court's
recent holding in United States v. Lopez62-the Commerce Clause of
the Constitution.63
In a majority opinion written by Judge Niemeyer, the Fourth
Circuit agreed with defendants, holding that the Corps exceeded its
congressional authorization in promulgating § 328.3(a)(3) because
the regulation as it stood extended the jurisdiction of the Act beyond
the scope of the commerce power.' Judge Payne joined this portion
of the opinion,65 but Judge Luttig did not, although it is likely that
Judge Luttig agrees with Judge Niemeyer's analysis of the issue.66
Judge Niemeyer's opinion emphasized that the "other waters"
provision premised the Corps's jurisdiction on a potential connection
between the activities regulated and interstate commerce. 67 Judge
Niemeyer stated that "[t]he regulation requires neither that the
regulated activity have a substantial effect on interstate commerce,
nor that the covered waters have any sort of nexus with navigable, or
even interstate waters. ' 6 He went on to state that if this regulation
were a statute, "serious constitutional difficulties" would be present.69
However, given that it was a mere regulation, Judge Niemeyer
indicated that the court would not "lightly presume" that Congress,
via the Act, had granted the Corps authority to assert its jurisdiction
in such a "sweeping and constitutionally troubling manner. '70
Payne dissented. See id. at 266 (Luttig, J., concurring); id. (Payne, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
62. 514 U.S. 549 (1995); see infra notes 174-214 and accompanying text (discussing
Lopez).
63. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; Wilson, 133 F.3d at 255.
64. See Wilson, 133 F.3d at 256-57.
65. See id. at 266 (Payne, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
66. See id. at 266 (Luttig, J., concurring in the judgment). Judge Luttig believed that
Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 132 F.3d 949 (4th Cir. 1997),
vacated, reh'g en banc granted (Feb. 5, 1998), which upheld Title III of the Violence
Against Women Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994), against a Commerce Clause
challenge, precluded Judge Niemeyer's analysis of the validity of the "other waters"
provision. See Wilson, 133 F.3d at 266 (Luttig, J., concurring in the judgment). Judge
Luttig dissented from the holding in Brzonkala, see Brzonkala, 132 F.3d at 974 (Luttig, J.,
dissenting), however, and thus appears to agree with the logic behind Judge Niemeyer's
analysis on this score. See Wilson, 133 F.3d at 266 (Luttig, J., concurring in the judgment)
(referring to Judge Niemeyer's opinion as "convincing"). In the final analysis, Judge
Luttig's dissent in Wilson may-be somewhat disingenuous. On February 5, 1998, the
Fourth Circuit vacated the panel opinion in Brzonkala for an en banc hearing.
67. See Wilson, 133 F.3d at 256-57.
68. Id. at 257.
69. Id.
70. Id.
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Accordingly, the court struck down the "other waters" provision as
an expansion of jurisdiction by the Corps that exceeded the
boundaries of congressional authorization under the Act.7'
Notably, the constitutionality of the Act was never at issue in
Wilson; the defendants only challenged the regulation and not the
Act itself.72 Furthermore, the majority opinion acknowledged that
Congress's power over navigable waters was not questioned.73 The
court noted that Congress historically has been recognized as
possessing the power to regulate navigable waters under the
Commerce Clause.74 The critical issue, therefore, was how much
further the phrase "waters of the United States" extends beyond
"navigable waters." 75 The majority acknowledged that the Supreme
Court had stated that because Congress defined "navigable waters"
as "waters of the United States," Congress's intent was to "regulate
at least some waters that would not be deemed 'navigable' under the
classical understanding of that term."'76 Consistent with this holding,
the court admitted that it is "indisputable" that Congress has the
power to regulate some non-navigable waters, but considered what
the limits of this regulatory power are under Lopez.77
By way of dicta, Judge Niemeyer performed a brief analysis of
what kinds of waters may be regulated consistent with Lopez.78 First,
he stated that discharge of pollutants into any waters that
substantially affect interstate commerce can be regulated by
Congress.79 Second, Judge Niemeyer noted that it is appropriate for
Congress to regulate discharges of pollutants into non-navigable
waters in order to protect the use, or potential use, of navigable
waters8° under the theory that navigable waters are channels or
instrumentalities of commerce that can be protected by regulation
under the Commerce Clause according to Lopez.8' Finally, he
speculated that it may be proper for Congress to regulate the
71. See id.
72. See id. at 255-56.
73. See id. at 256.
74. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 22 (1824) ("It is a common principle,
that arms of the sea, including navigable rivers, belong to the sovereign, so far as
navigation is concerned.... The United States possess the general power over
navigation, and, of course, ought to control, in general, the use of navigable waters.").
75. See supra note 53 (explaining the term "navigable waters").
76. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 133 (1985).
77. See Wilson, 133 F.3d at 256.
78. See id.
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,558 (1995).
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discharge of pollutants into waters that flow across state lines or flow
into waters crossing state lines, regardless of whether or not the
waters are actually navigable, due to the "interstate nature of such
waters." 2 Judge Niemeyer was quick to point out, however, that
such a broad assertion of jurisdiction may be questionable under the
Supreme Court's recent Tenth Amendment jurisprudence. 83
Another closely related issue raised on appeal was whether
jurisdiction over the parcels in question was appropriate due to their
status as "adjacent wetlands" as defined by § 328.3(a)(7) of the Act.",
Defendants challenged the district court's instructions to the jury
which stated that "adjacent wetlands" included "wetlands ...
'without a direct or indirect surface connection' with interstate
waters."8 5 Judge Niemeyer agreed with defendants, however, that the
Fourth Circuit's stance on this issue is not clear because Judge Luttig
concurred in the judgment only and did not address the merits of this
holding.86 Moreover, Judge Payne dissented on the grounds that the
jury instructions were appropriate under earlier Supreme Court
precedentY Thus, the Fourth Circuit never fully resolved the
adjacency issue in Wilson; rather, the core holding with respect to the
Corps's jurisdiction under the § 404 permit program is the Fourth
Circuit's rejection of the "other waters" provision.
To understand the Wilson defendants' Commerce Clause
challenge, it is necessary to understand the mechanics of the statute
at issue. The Act is a broad and complicated statute enacted to
"restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity
of the Nation's waters."' The Act is comprehensive in scope,
approaching its goal from a variety of directions, including providing
for research; 9 developing pollution control programs;90 establishing
grants for waste treatment works;91 setting water quality and
82- Wilson, 133 F.3d at 256.
83. The Wilson court pointed to Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997);
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); Lopez; and New York v. United States, 505
U.S. 144 (1992), to support this proposition. See Wilson, 133 F.3d at 256.
84. See Wilson, 133 F.3d at 257-58; 33 C.F.R. 328.3(a)(7) (1997).
85. Wilson, 133 F.3d at 257 (quoting the district court's jury instructions).
86. See id. at 266 (Luttig, J., concurring in the judgment).
87. See id.; id. at 266-68 (Payne, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (relying
on United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985)).
88. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1994); see Oliver A. Houck, Clean Water Act and Related
Programs, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, at 241 (A.L.I.-A.B.A. Course of Study, Feb. 12,
1997), available in WESTLAW at SB52 ALI-ABA 241.
89. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1254-1255.
90. See id. §1256.
91. See id. §§ 1281-1299.
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technology standards;9 establishing permit programs; 93 and providing
for enforcement of these standards and permits.94
One of the most important parts of the Act concerning wetlands
protection is the § 404 permit program;95 consequently, it is also one
of the most controversial parts of the Act.96  The § 404 permit
program specifically requires permits in connection with the
discharge of "dredged" or "fill" material into "navigable waters." 97
Congress delegated authority for administering the program to the
Corps. 8  The Corps, in turn, promulgates regulations for
administering the program.99  The Corps's regulations define
"dredged material" as "material that is excavated or dredged from
92. See id. §§ 1311-1318; see also Theodore L. Garrett, Overview of the Clean Water
Act, in THE CLEAN WATER Acr HANDBOOK, supra note 22, at 1, 1-2 (giving an overview
of water-quality based standards and technology based standards). In setting standards,
the Clean Water Act also regulates liability for spills of toxic or hazardous substances.
See 33 U.S.C. § 1321; see also Karen M. Wardzinski, Oil and Hazardous Substance Spills,
in THE CLEAN WATER ACr HANDBOOK, supra note 22, at 183, 183-92 (providing an
overview of issues related to hazardous spills).
93. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1341-1345.
94. See id. § 1319. The Act also provides for citizen suits. See id. § 1365; see generally
Karen M. McGaffey et al., Enforcement, in THE CLEAN WATER Acr HANDBOOK, supra
note 22, at 195, 216-21 (providing a brief overview of citizen suits).
95. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344. For a comprehensive review of the jurisdiction, procedure,
and liabilities under the program, see generally Liebesman, supra note 22. For a primer
on wetlands regulation, see Mark A. Chertok, Federal Regulation of Wetlands, in
ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION, at 859 (A.L.I.-A.B.A. Course of Study, June 23, 1997),
available in WESTLAW at SB91 ALI-ABA 859. For a guide to the permit process, see
Lawrence R. Liebesman & Philip T. Hundemann, Regulatory Standards for Permits Under
the Clean Water Act Section 404 Permit Program, in THE NATURAL RESOURCES LAW
MANUAL 3, 3-19 (Richard J. Fink ed., 1995).
96. See Houck, supra note 88, at 244. Houck argues that "Section 404 has been the
most controversial provision in the Act and, the case could be made, of all environmental
law. It pits the nation's most productive and threatened ecosystems against its most
cherished notions of private property development ... several thousand times per year."
Id.
97. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a). Section 1344(a) reads:
(a) Discharge into navigable waters at specified disposal sites
The Secretary may issue permits, after notice and opportunity for public
hearings for the discharge of dredged or fill material into the navigable waters at
specified disposal sites. Not later than the fifteenth day after the date an
applicant submits all the information required to complete an application for a
permit under this subsection, the Secretary shall publish the notice required by
this subsection.
Id.
98. See id. § 1344(a), (d). The administration of permit programs may be further
delegated to the states. See id. § 1344(h); 33 C.F.R. § 323.5 (1997); 40 C.F.R. §§ 124, 233
(1997).
99. See 33 C.F.R. § 323.
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waters of the United States,"1 ' and "fill material" as "any material
used for the primary purpose of replacing an aquatic area with dry
land or of changing the bottom elevation of an [sic] waterbody."10'
Anyone engaging in these activities without a § 404 permit or in
violation of the terms of a permit may be liable under § 1311(a) of
the Act,1 1 and violations of conditions or limitations set forth in the
permit can be enjoined and punished by civil penalties.03
The Wilson defendants were convicted of violating § 1311,104
which makes the discharge of "any pollutant by any person"
unlawful, subject to several exceptions, including compliance with the
§ 404 permit program.10 5 To understand what the prohibition covers,
the list of definitions under § 1362 of the Act as well as several
definitions adopted by the Corps must be examined. Section 1362
defines "discharge of a pollutant" to mean, in part, "any addition of
any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source.10 6 The
definition for "pollutant" under § 1362 is broad and covers the fill
dirt and gravel at issue in Wilson."7 Similarly, "point source" is
broadly defined to cover any identifiable, discrete point of discharge
excluding agricultural run-off.08  The problematic phrase is
"navigable waters." The Act defines "navigable waters" as "waters
of the United States" in § 1362(7).109 The meaning of "waters of the
100. Id. § 323.2(c).
101. Id. § 323.2(e).
102 See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a).
103. See id. § 1344(s).
104. See Wilson, 133 F.3d at 254. Because the jury found that the defendants had
committed the violations knowingly, they also convicted the defendants for violating
§ 1319(c)(2)(A), which prescribes penalties for knowing violations of § 1311. See id. The
Fourth Circuit reversed this finding, however, on appeal. See id. at 266.
105. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) ("Except as in compliance with this section and sections 1312,
1316, 1317, 1328, 1342, and 1344 of this title, the discharge of any pollutant by any person
shall be unlawful.").
106. Id. § 1362(12).
107. See 33 U.S.C.A. § 1362(6) (West Supp. 1998) ("The term 'pollutant' means
dredged soil, solid waste, incinerator residue, sewage, garbage, sewage sludge, munitions,
chemical wastes, biological materials, radioactive materials, heat, wrecked or discarded
equipment, rock, sand, cellar dirt and industrial, municipal and agricultural waste
discharged into water.").
108. The term "point source" means:
any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, including but not limited to
any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, rolling
stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or other floating craft,
from which pollutants are or may be discharged. This term does not include
agricultural stormwater discharges and return flows from irrigated agriculture.
Id. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (1994).
109. Id. § 1362(7).
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United States" is defined not by the Act itself but rather by a
regulation of the Corps."' It is this regulation that defendants
challenged as beyond the scope of the commerce power."'
The Corps originally had defined "waters of the United States"
narrowly by limiting the definition to waters navigable in fact, that is,
those waters that theoretically can be navigated." However,
environmental groups challenged the Corps's interpretation. In
National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Callaway,"' the District
Court of the District of Columbia agreed with the plaintiffs, ordering
the Corps to rescind its existing regulations and replace them with
new ones asserting federal jurisdiction "to the maximum extent
permissible under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution" as was
intended by Congress."4 The Corps responded in 1975 with new
regulations recognizing a more expansive interpretation of "waters of
the United States.""' Congress considered narrowing this definition,
but ultimately did not." 6
Finally, in 1985, the Supreme Court approved the Corps's
broader interpretation of the phrase "waters of the United States" in
United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc."' In this case,
Riverside Bayview Homes ("Riverside") was the owner of eighty
acres of marshland in Michigan." 8 In 1976, Riverside began to add
fill material to the property to make it suitable for a housing
development."9 The Corps believed this property was an "adjacent
wetland" included in "waters of the United States" as defined in its
1975 regulations and filed suit to enjoin Riverside.' The district
court agreed with the Corps and enjoined Riverside from filling its
110. See 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a).
111. See Wilson, 133 F.3d at 255.
112. See Permits for Activities in Navigable Waters or Ocean Waters, 39 Fed. Reg.
12,115, 12,119 (1974) (defining "navigable waters of the United States" as "those waters
of the United States which are subject to the ebb and flow of the tide, and/or are
presently, or have been in the past, or may be in the future susceptible for use for
purposes of interstate or foreign commerce").
113. 392 F. Supp. 685 (D.D.C. 1975).
114. Id. at 686. It is not clear how the court came to this conclusion.
115. See Permits for Activities in Navigable Waters or Ocean Waters, 40 Fed. Reg.
31,320,31,324-25 (1975).
116. See United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 135-37 (1985)
(analyzing the legislative history of the 1977 amendments to the Clean Water Act).
117. 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
118. See id. at 124.
119. See id.
120. See id. These are the regulations adopted in response to the Callaway decision.
See supra notes 113-15 and accompanying text.
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land without a permit.'21 Riverside appealed, and in 1980, the Sixth
Circuit remanded with instructions to consider the effect of
intervening amendments to the regulation made in 1977.122 The
district court again upheld the Corps's jurisdiction, and again
Riverside appealed.11 This time, the Sixth Circuit reversed.1 24
The Supreme Court, in turn, reversed the Sixth Circuit and
upheld jurisdiction based on the language, history, and policy of the
Act."25 The Court held that Congress chose to give the Act broad
coverage when it defined "navigable waters" as "waters of the United
States," intending to regulate some waters that were not navigable in
fact.126 Furthermore, the Court found that the Corps's inclusion of
adjacent wetlands in the definition of "waters of the United States"
was not unreasonable given the broad scope of the Act and the
inherent difficulties of precisely defining regulable waters,
particularly when considering the interconnectivity of hydrological
systems.27 Riverside is the Court's latest word on the extent of
jurisdiction under the Act; however, the Supreme Court's Commerce
Clause jurisprudence has changed dramatically since then.'2
The Riverside Court addressed only adjacent wetlands in its
decision. The specific regulation with which the Wilson court took
issue, however, is the more expansive "other waters" provision,
which extends jurisdiction to isolated wetlands not necessarily
located near any navigable waters .12  The "other waters" provision
defines "waters of the United States" to include: "All other waters
such as intrastate lakes, rivers, streams (including intermittent
streams), mudflats, sandflats, wetlands, sloughs, prairie potholes, wet
meadows, playa lakes, or natural ponds, the use, degradation or
destruction of which could affect interstate or foreign commerce. 13 0
121. See Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 125.
122. See id.
123. See id.
124. See United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 729 F.2d 391 (6th Cir. 1984).
125. See Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 139.
126. See id. at 133.
127. See id. at 134-35.
128. See infra notes 171-214 and accompanying text.
129. See Wilson, 133 F.3d at 256-57.
130. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3) (1997). Section 328.3(a)(1)-(7) in its entirety reads as
follows:
The term waters of the United States means
(1) All waters which are currently used, or were used in the past, or may be
susceptible to use in interstate or foreign commerce, including all waters
which are subject to the ebb and flow of the tide;
(2) All interstate waters including interstate wetlands;
(3) All other waters such as intrastate lakes, rivers, streams (including
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The Fourth Circuit in Wilson held that the "other waters" provision
did not necessarily regulate an activity having a substantial effect on
interstate commerce and did not require that the "waters" have any
sort of nexus with navigable or interstate waters"'-the implication
being that the regulation did not fall within one of the categories of
activities susceptible to regulation under the Commerce Clause as
enumerated in Lopez."2 The Fourth Circuit went on to suggest that
if this regulation were a statute, it might be unconstitutional because
it would have exceeded congressional authority under the Commerce
Clause. 33  Acknowledging that the regulation was merely a
regulation, however, the court said that absent a "clear indication to
the contrary," it would not presume that Congress authorized the
Corps to assert its jurisdiction via the "other waters" provision in
such a constitutionally questionable manner . 34 The Fourth Circuit
also stated, without further elaboration, that even as a matter of
statutory construction, "waters of the United States" should be
interpreted to mean waters that are at least interstate or closely
related to navigable or interstate waters.135 Accordingly, the Fourth
Circuit held that the Corps exceeded its statutory authority under the
Act when it promulgated § 328.3(a)(3)." 6
The United States Constitution gives Congress the power "[t]o
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
intermittent streams), mudflats, sandflats, wetlands, sloughs, prairie
potholes, wet meadows, playa lakes, or natural ponds, the use, degradation
or destruction of which could affect interstate or foreign commerce
including any such waters:
(i) Which are or could be used by interstate or foreign travelers for
recreational or other purposes; or
(ii) From which fish or shellfish are or could be taken and sold in
interstate or foreign commerce; or
(iii) Which are used or could be used for industrial purpose by
industries in interstate commerce;
(4) All impoundments of waters otherwise defined as waters of the United
States under the definition;
(5) Tributaries of waters identified in paragraphs (a)(1) through (4) of this
section;
(6) The territorial seas;
(7) Wetlands adjacent to waters (other than waters that are themselves
wetlands) identified in paragraphs (a)(1) through (6) of this section.
33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(1)-(7).
131. See Wilson, 133 F.3d at 257.
132. See infra notes 185-88 and accompanying text.
133. See Wilson, 133 F.3d at 257.
134. Id.
135. See id.
136. See id.
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States, and with the Indian Tribes. 137  Lopez is the most recent
statement on Commerce Clause jurisprudence by the Court. While
the lasting significance of Lopez is not entirely clear, Lopez marks
the first occasion in over sixty years that the Court has ruled a federal
statute unconstitutional for exceeding Commerce Clause power.138
To understand the defendants' Lopez challenge to the "other waters"
provision, it is worth considering Lopez in relation to prior
Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
The progenitor of Commerce Clause jurisprudence is Chief
Justice Marshall's oft-cited opinion in Gibbons v. Ogden.139 At issue
in Gibbons was a New York statute granting an exclusive license to
conduct steamship travel between New York and New Jersey. 4 ' New
Jersey retaliated by allowing New Jersey citizens who were sued in
New York under the statute to recover treble damages in New Jersey
courts.' 4' The Court struck down the New York statute, holding that
it was preempted by an earlier federal statute. 42 Chief Justice
Marshall, writing for a unanimous Court, defined the commerce
power as plenary, using broad language: "It is the power to regulate;
that is, to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed.
This power ... is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost
extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in
the constitution." 143 In contrast to this sweeping statement, Chief
Justice Marshall also recognized inherent limitations present in the
language of the Commerce Clause: "Comprehensive as the word
'among' is, it may very properly be restricted to that commerce which
concerns more States than one.... The enumeration presupposes
something not enumerated; and that something, if we regard the
language,... must be the exclusively internal commerce of a
State."'" In considering whether the commerce power extended to
purely intrastate activities, Chief Justice Marshall stated that "[s]uch
a power would be inconvenient, and is certainly unnecessary.' 45
Thus, the Gibbons Court established a definition of the Commerce
137. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
138. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 304 (1936), had been the last. See Julian
Epstein, Evolving Spheres of Federalism After U.S. v. Lopez and Other Cases, 34 HARV.
J. ON LEGIS. 525,528 (1997).
139. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
140. See id. at 1-2.
141. See id. at 4-5.
142. See id. at 213-17.
143. Id. at 196.
144. Id. at 194-95.
145. Id. at 194.
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Clause expansive in coverage yet limited by its own language.
Until the late nineteenth century, the Court remained relatively
silent with respect to the dimensions of Congress's power under the
Commerce Clause, in part because the controversy over slavery
prevented consensus in exercising the power.'46 After the Civil War,
Congress began to exercise its commerce power with new vigor. The
passage of the Interstate Commerce Act 47 in 1887 and the Sherman
Antitrust Act"8 in 1890 marked a "new era of federal regulation
under the commerce power."14 9  During the late 1800s and early
1900s, the Court made numerous attempts to divide activities into
commercial and non-commercial categories according to formalistic
distinctions' 50 or to distinguish between an activity's "direct" and
"indirect effects" on commerce.'5' While frequently overruling acts
146. See GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 194 (3rd ed. 1996). In
fact, most decisions in the 1800s revolved around the "dormant" Commerce Clause,
which concerned state legislation burdening interstate commerce as opposed to the limits
of federal power. See, e.g., Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1 (1888) (upholding an Iowa statute
prohibiting the manufacture of liquor). For a history of dormant Commerce Clause
jurisprudence, see Sam Kalen, Reawakening the Dormant Commerce Clause in Its First
Century, 13 U. DAYTON L. REv. 417 (1988).
147. Interstate Commerce Act, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).
148. Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1994)).
149. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 554 (1995); see also Wickard v. Filburn, 317
U.S. 111, 121 (1942) (describing nineteenth century Commerce Clause jurisprudence);
STONE ET AL., supra note 146, at 194-95 (briefly describing the commerce power during
the post-Civil War era).
150. For example, the Court frequently separated mining, agriculture, and
manufacturing from commerce in its analyses. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298
U.S. 238, 304 (1936) ("Mining brings the subject matter of commerce into existence.
Commerce disposes of it."); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 272 (1918) ("The
making of goods and the mining of coal are not commerce, nor does the fact that these
things are to be afterwards shipped or used in interstate commerce, make their
production a part thereof."), overruled by United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941);
United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 12 (1895) ("Commerce succeeds to
manufacture, and is not a part of it.").
151. See, e.g., Carter Coal, 298 U.S. at 309 (labeling the prohibited activities as "local
controversies and evils affecting local work undertaken to accomplish that local result,"
and that any effect on commerce by such activities as "secondary and indirect"); A.L.A.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 548 (1935) ("[T]he distinction
between direct and indirect effects of intrastate transactions upon interstate commerce
must be recognized as a fundamental one, essential to the maintenance of our
constitutional system."); E.C. Knight, 156 U.S. at 12 ("[A]Ithough [manufacturing] may
result in bringing the operation of commerce into play, it does not control it, and affects it
only incidentally and indirectly."). Note, however, that the Court's formalistic line-
drawing did not always result in the invalidation of federal statutes. See, e.g., United
Mine Workers of Am. v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344 (1922) (upholding antitrust
laws as applied to striking coal miners); Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495 (1922)
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of Congress predicated on the Commerce Clause, the Court did find
several narrow categories of subject matter to be appropriate objects
of federal regulation under the commerce power, such as the
instrumentalities of commerce' and certain prohibited items in the
flow of commerce.1 '
This state of affairs continued until 1937, when the Court handed
down its watershed decision in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp.154 In that case, the Court finally rejected earlier formalistic
approaches and adopted a realistic approach toward the Commerce
Clause. Upholding the National Labor Relations Act of 1935,155 the
Court dismissed the argument that the statute exceeded the
congressional power, stating: "We are asked to shut our eyes to the
plainest facts of our national life and to deal with the question of
direct and indirect effects in an intellectual vacuum." '156 The Court
continued: "We have often said that interstate commerce itself is a
practical conception. It is equally true that interferences with that
commerce must be appraised by a judgment that does not ignore
actual experience.""' This shift from constructing substantive
distinctions, often semantic in nature, to examining actual effects of
an activity on interstate commerce marked a dramatic shift in the
Court's thinking on the commerce power. 58
On the heels of Jones & Laughlin Steel, the Court handed down
a series of decisions upholding key New Deal legislation.159 In United
States v. Darby,160 the Court upheld the Fair Labor Standards Act,161
(upholding the Packers and Stockyard Act of 1921); Swift & Co. v. United States, 196
U.S. 375 (1905) (upholding the regulation of stockyards under the Sherman Act).
152. See, e.g., The Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.S. 342 (1914) (regulating intrastate
railway rates).
153. See, e.g., Kentucky Whip & Collar Co. v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 299 U.S. 334 (1937)
(addressing goods made by convicts); Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308 (1913)
(upholding the White Slave Act banning the transport of women across state lines for
immoral purposes); Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 45 (1911) (addressing
tainted eggs); Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903) (addressing lottery tickets).
154. 301 U.S. 1 (1937); see Lopez, 514 U.S. at 555 (referring to Jones & Laughlin Steel
as a "watershed case"); Epstein, supra note 4, at 1443 (calling Jones & Laughlin Steel
"[t]he first major case to test the traditional analysis of the [C]ommerce [C]lause");
Regan, supra note 2, at 603 (calling Jones & Laughlin Steel "the first great case of the
modem era of the Commerce Clause").
155. National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act), ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935)
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 151-169 (1994).
156. Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. at 41.
157. Id. at 41-42.
158. See Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317,333 (1997).
159. See infra notes 160-70 and accompanying text.
160. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
161. Fair Labor Standards Act, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1068 (1938) (codified as amended at
378 [Vol. 77
1998] INTERSTATE COMMERCE AND WETLANDS 379
holding that Congress may regulate intrastate activities where those
activities have a "substantial effect on interstate commerce."'162 In
Wickard v. Filbum,63 the Court upheld the Agricultural Adjustment
Act of 1938,1' again firmly rejecting prior semantic distinctions. 65 In
order to stabilize wheat prices, the Agricultural Adjustment Act
established limits on the amount of wheat a farmer could grow. 66
Roscoe Filburn exceeded his allotment and was penalized according
to the terms of the statute.67 A particularly noteworthy aspect of
Wickard is that the statute was upheld as it applied to wheat that
Filburn had grown for personal consumption in the form of feed for
his poultry and livestock, flour for home use, and seed for future
crops." s Rather than measure the impact of decreased demand due
to Filburn's extra harvest, the Court chose to analyze the impact from
an aggregate standpoint: "That appellee's own contribution to the
demand for wheat may be trivial by itself is not enough to remove
him from the scope of federal regulation where, as here, his
contribution, taken together with that of many others similarly
situated, is far from trivial.' 69 Thus, even though a single instance
29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1994 & Supp. 1995)).
162. Darby, 312 U.S. at 119. Similar legislation regulating child labor had been struck
down by the Court some 20 years earlier in Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
Darby expressly overruled Dagenhart. See Darby, 312 U.S. at 116-17.
163. 317 U.S. 111 (1942). While the Lopez Court referred to Wickard as "perhaps the
most far reaching example of Commerce Clause authority over intrastate activity," United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 560 (1995), others have downplayed its significance. See
Jim Chen, Filburn's Forgotten Footnote-of Farm Team Federalism and Its Fate, 82 MINN.
L. REV. 249, 276-80 (1997) (describing the significance of the Wickard holding as more
myth than history).
164. Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, ch. 30,52 Stat. 31 (codified as amended at 7
U.S.C. §§ 1281-1393 (1994 & Supp. 1996)).
165. See Wickard, 317 U.S. at 124-25. In Wickard, the Court explained:
Whether the subject of the regulation in question was "production,"
"consumption," or "marketing" is, therefore, not material for purposes of
deciding the question of federal power before us. That an activity is of local
character may help in a doubtful case to determine whether Congress intended
to reach it.... But even if appellee's activity be local and though it may not be
regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress
if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce and this
irrespective of whether such effect is what might at some earlier time have been
defined as "direct" or "indirect."
Id.
166. See id. at 115.
167. See id. at 114-15.
168. See id. at 114.
169. Id. at 127-28. This same aggregation principle would later play a definitive role in
determining whether or not a substantial effect on interstate commerce was present.
Compare Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154-55 (1971) (holding that extortionate
credit transactions affect interstate commerce despite their intrastate character), with
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may be insignificant, the Court chose to look at the cumulative
effects of all individual instances. This precedent effectively lowered
the standard to show that a regulated activity affected commerce.17
Following Jones & Laughlin Steel, Darby, and Wickard, the
Court charted an expansive course in Commerce Clause
jurisprudence,' yet it never explicitly rejected the idea that there are
limits to congressional power under the Commerce Clause. 72 During
this period the Court maintained a highly deferential attitude toward
Congress's exercise of the commerce power. 73 Thus, the tenor of
Commerce Clause jurisprudence preceding Lopez can be
characterized as a lengthy period of expansiveness reflecting a
reluctance to second-guess Congress. Lopez marked the first bump
in the road to unabated federal power through the Commerce
Clause.
In Lopez, the respondent, a twelfth-grade student at the time,
was arrested for carrying a concealed handgun on school grounds.174
Initially charged with a violation of state law, the respondent later
was charged by federal agents' 75 with violating the Gun-Free School
Zones Act of 1990.176 The statute made it a federal crime to possess a
firearm within 1000 feet of school grounds. 7 7 After being convicted
and sentenced to six months imprisonment by the district court,
respondent appealed to the Fifth Circuit, arguing that the Gun-Free
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,561 (1995) (determining that federal law prohibiting
possession of a gun within 1000 feet of a school was not part of a larger economic
regulatory scheme).
170. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 600-01 (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting with disapproval
the fact that trivial activities having insignificant effects on commerce can be regulated
under the commerce power using the "aggregation principle").
171. Congress conspicuously exercised its Commerce Clause power when it passed
civil rights legislation in the 1960s. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379
U.S. 241 (1964) (upholding a Commerce Clause challenge to Title II of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (companion case).
172. See, e.g., Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 196-97 (1968) ("But while the
commerce power has limits, valid general regulations of commerce do not cease to be
regulations of commerce because a State is involved."), overruled by National League of
Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
173. See, e.g., Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264,
276 (1981) ("The court must defer to a congressional finding that a regulated activity
affects interstate commerce, if there is any rational basis for such a finding."); Heart of
Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 258 (setting the standard as whether Congress had a rational
basis for its determination that commerce was affected).
174. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551.
175. See id. The state law charge was dropped because of the imposition of federal
charges. See id.
176. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
177. See id.; id2 § 921(a)(25) (Supp. V 1993) (defining "school zone").
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School Zones Act of 1990 exceeded Congress's power under the
Commerce Clause.178 The Fifth Circuit agreed 79 and the Supreme
Court granted certiorari. 80
In Lopez, the Court struck down the Gun-Free School Zones
Act as unconstitutional because it was beyond the scope of
congressional power under the Commerce Clause. Of the six
separate opinions in Lopez, four adequately illuminate the
differences in thought among the justices: the majority opinion
written by Chief Justice Rehnquist;'8 ' two concurring opinions, one
by Justice Kennedy'8 and a second by Justice Thomas;'83 and a
dissenting opinion by Justice Breyer."8
Chief Justice Rehnquist started his opinion with a recounting of
Commerce Clause jurisprudence from Gibbons to the present.'8 He
then enumerated three broad categories of activity that are
permissible objects of federal regulation. First, Congress may
legislate with respect to the "use of the channels of interstate
commerce."1 86  Second, Congress may "regulate and protect the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in
interstate commerce" even though the regulated activity is of an
intrastate character.y8 Finally, Congress has the power to regulate
activities that "substantially affect" interstate commerce. 8
In applying this three-pronged analysis to the Gun-Free School
Zones Act, Chief Justice Rehnquist quickly dispatched with the first
178. See United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1345 (5th Cir. 1993), affd, 514 U.S. 549
(1995).
179. See id. at 1367-68.
180. See United States v. Lopez, 511 U.S. 1029 (1994) (granting certiorari).
181. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995). Justices O'Connor, Scalia,
Kennedy, and Thomas joined the Chief Justice. See id.
182 See id. at 568 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor joined Justice
Kennedy in his concurrence. See id.
183. See id at 584 (Thomas, J., concurring).
184. See id. at 615 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg
joined Justice Breyer in his dissent. See id. Justices Stevens and Souter also filed
separate dissents. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 602 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 603 (Souter,
J., dissenting). Because both Justices joined Justice Breyer's dissent, their dissents will
not be discussed separately.
185. See id. at 552-58.
186. Id. at 558.
187. Id.
188. See id. at 558-59. In the past, the Court had not been clear as to whether the
regulated activity had to "affect" or "substantially affect" interstate commerce in order
for Congress to act within the extent of the commerce power. See id. at 559. The
majority set the standard as "substantially affects," finding this interpretation consistent
with the "great weight" of the Court's case law. Id.
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two categories and turned his focus to the third.189 In determining
that the statute did not regulate any activity "substantially
affect[ing]" interstate commerce, the Chief Justice highlighted two
factors: first, by its own terms the statute "has nothing to do with6commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise" nor was it part of a
larger economic regulatory scheme;19 and second, the statute had no
jurisdictional component that, on a case-by-case basis, would
guarantee application of the law only under circumstances where
interstate commerce was involved.' 9 '
Permeating Chief Justice Rehnquist's analysis is a concern more
properly classified as one of federalism or of the Tenth Amendment
rather than one relating to the nexus between the regulated activity
and interstate commerce.1" The Chief Justice voiced the Court's
concern that the government's arguments made it "difficult to
perceive any limitation on federal power, even in areas such as
criminal law enforcement or education where States historically have
been sovereign ."'193 This protective stance towards state sovereignty
is consistent with the Court's recent federalism jurisprudence. 94
189. See id. at 559. In making its argument the government never argued that there
was jurisdiction under the first two categories to enact § 922(q). See Brief for Petitioner
at 8-11, Lopez (No. 93-1260); Adam Hirsh, United States v. Lopez A Commerce Clause
Challenge, Presentation at the University of Idaho College of Law (Feb. 3, 1996), adapted
in 32 IDAHO L. REv. 505,506 (1996).
190. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.
191. See id. (citing United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971)). A jurisdictional
component is one that limits the reach of a federal statute, like § 922(q), to those
activities that "have an explicit connection with or effect on interstate commerce." Id. at
562.
192. See Daniel A. Farber, The Constitution's Forgotten Cover Letter: An Essay on the
New Federalism and the Original Understanding, 94 MIcH. L. REv. 615, 622-26 (1995)
(discussing federalism in the Lopez opinion); Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism:
United States v. Lopez, 1995 Sup. CT. REv. 125, 129 (describing Lopez as an "act of
interpretive fidelity"); Stephen M. McJohn, The Impact of United States v. Lopez: The
New Hybrid Commerce Clause, 34 DUQ. L. REV. 1 (1995) (arguing that the Lopez Court
combined inherent limitations on the commerce power and external Tenth Amendment
limitations on the commerce power to produce a heightened scrutiny of federal regulation
of areas historically the province of the states).
193. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 654.
194. See Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517
U.S. 44 (1996); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992); see also Erwin
Chemerinsky, Formalism and Functionalism in Federal Analysis, 13 GA. ST. U. L. REV.
959 (1997) (arguing for a functional as opposed to formalistic approach to federalism);
Herbert Hovenkamp, Judicial Restraint and Constitutional Federalism: The Supreme
Court's Lopez and Seminole Tribe Decisions, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 2213, 2213 (1996)(discussing the Court's encroachment on the legislature); Vicki C. Jackson, Seminole
Tribe, The Eleventh Amendment, and the Potential Evisceration of Ex Parte Young, 72
N.Y.U. L. REv. 495 (1997) (discussing Seminole Tribe's impact on federalism); H.
Jefferson Powell, The Oldest Question of Constitutional Law, 79 VA. L. REV. 633 (1993)
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Justice Kennedy's concurrence elaborated on this theme. He
expressed reservations about the lack of political responsibility that
inheres when the federal balance is upset, as is the case when the
federal government regulates non-commercial activities traditionally
under the domain of the states.195 In the end, Justice Kennedy
concluded that the statute was "an unconstitutional assertion of the
commerce power." 96  He also noted, however, that "in this
interdependent world of ours" any activity may ultimately have
either a commercial origin or consequence. 197 Carrying this logic to
its extreme, the commerce power becomes absolute, obliterating any
meaningful distinctions between the state and federal governments-
a scenario which, at some point, exceeds the commerce power. It is
in this context, Justice Kennedy noted, that the question of state
sovereignty is a useful inquiry to determine when Congress has
exceeded the limits of the Commerce Clause. 98
Although he joined the majority opinion in Lopez, Justice
Kennedy qualified his concurrence with two important points. First,
he noted that history has shown solely content-based distinctions to
be imprecise and unworkable.199  Second, he emphasized the
importance of stability in Commerce Clause jurisprudence.200 Given
the vested interest the Court and the legal system have in stability,
Justice Kennedy cautioned that the principle of stare decisis
precludes an outright reversal of the expansive Commerce Clause
jurisprudence witnessed during the past sixty years.20' Summarizing,
he stated: "Congress can regulate in the commercial sphere on the
(discussing federalism and the New York case).
195. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 577 (Kennedy, J., concurring). The importance of political
accountability is a recurring theme in recent Tenth Amendment jurisprudence. See
Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2378 ("The insistence of the Framers upon unity in the Federal
Executive--to insure both vigor and accountability--is well known."); New York, 505
U.S. at 169 (noting that when the federal government compels regulation by the states,
the state administrators may "bear the brunt of public disapproval, while the federal
officials who devised the regulatory program may remain insulated from the electoral
ramifications of their decision"). The Court in New York further commented that
"[a]ccountability is thus diminished when, due to federal coercion, elected state officials
cannot regulate in accordance with the views of the local electorate." Id.
196. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
197. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
198. See id. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
199. See id. at 574 (Kennedy, J., concurring); supra notes 146-70 and accompanying
text (describing Commerce Clause jurisprudence from the late nineteenth century to the
1930s).
200. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 574 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("[T]he Court as an
institution and the legal system as a whole have an immense stake in the stability of our
Commerce Clause jurisprudence as it has evolved to this point.").
201. See id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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assumption that we have a single market and a unified purpose to
build a stable national economy."2'
Justice Thomas concurred with the majority opinion, yet
characterized the "substantial effects" test by the majority as a broad,
expansive test.23 He went so far as to state that the test "lack[ed] ...
any grounding in the original understanding of the Constitution" and
"grant[ed] Congress a police power over the Nation."'204  In fact,
Justice Thomas indicated a preference for and a return to the
formalistic distinctions that pervaded pre-New Deal Commerce
Clause jurisprudence.05 Unlike the majority or dissent, Justice
Thomas indicated a readiness to revisit and overrule earlier
Commerce Clause decisions, but also acknowledged that this might
be a difficult task 2 6 In the end, Justice Thomas welcomed a change
in modern Commerce Clause jurisprudence.207
In striking contrast to Justice Thomas's call for a massive
rollback of the commerce power, Justice Breyer argued in dissent
that the Gun-Free School Zones Act was well within congressional
power because it regulated an activity that had a significant effect on
commerce, or at least that Congress had a rational basis for believing
the statute regulated an activity having a significant effect on
commerce.2 11 Justice Breyer preferred a more deferential "rational
basis" standard because the Constitution explicitly delegated the
commerce power to Congress, and legislatures generally are in a
better position to make empirical judgments with respect to the
factual connection between the regulated activity and interstate
202- Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
203. See id. at 584-602 (Thomas, J., concurring).
204. Id. at 599-600 (Thomas, J., concurring).
205. See id. at 586 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("As one would expect, the term
'commerce' was used in contradistinction to productive activities such as manufacturing
and agriculture.").
206. See id. at 601 n.8 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas explained, "Although
I might be willing to return to the original understanding, I recognize that many believe
that it is too late ... to undertake a fundamental reexamination of the past 60 years.
Consideration of stare decisis and reliance interests may convince us that we cannot wipe
the slate clean." Id.
207. See iL at 602 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("At an appropriate juncture, I think we
must modify our Commerce Clause jurisprudence."). Justice Thomas is not alone on this
score. See Epstein, supra note 5, at 190 ("So what should be done? The most attractive
possibility is to roll back the carpet to the original 1787 position.... [T]hat means to take
all the decisions that are regarded as sacrosanct by everyone but Justice Thomas, and
overrule them one and all, preferably with a single blow.").
208. See id. at 616-17 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer preferred the term
"significant" to "substantial," but also indicated that it would make no difference in this
case. See id. at 616 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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commerce.2 9 Justice Breyer believed this standard to be met because
education is "inextricably intertwined" with the economy2 '0 The
presence of guns in schools significantly affects the quality of
education children receive, thereby affecting national productivity as
a whole. 21' Furthermore, when deciding where to locate, businesses
often factor in heavily the presence of an educated work force 12
Finally, when determining how significant an activity's impact is on
interstate commerce, the cumulative effect of all similar instances
must be considered, not just individual occurrences in isolation.1 3
On the basis of these arguments, Justice Breyer concluded that there
was sufficient evidence for Congress to find a significant connection
to interstate commerce to uphold the statute.214
In the wake of Lopez, many commentators predicted far-
reaching consequences because a multitude of legislation had been
passed pursuant to the Commerce Clause since 1937, including
environmental legislation such as the Clean Water Act.2 5 Not
surprisingly, challenges have already surfaced in the lower courts 1 6
Just over two and one-half months prior to the Wilson decision,
the Fourth Circuit decided United States v. Hartsell.2 7 Because of
Hartsell, it is unclear where the Fourth Circuit presently stands on the
limits of constitutionally permissible jurisdiction under the Clean
Water Act. The defendants in Hartsell owned and operated a
209. See iL at 616-17 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
210. Id. at 620 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
211. See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
212. See id. at 622 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
213. See id. at 616 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
214. See id. at 631 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
215. See Karkkainen, supra note 6, at 77 (describing federal environmental regulation
as having "long been assumed to be a valid exercise of the Commerce power"); Warner,
supra note 6, at 340-41 ("While it is true that some environmental laws have been based
on authority arising from other Constitutional clauses, such as the Property Clause, most
of the environmental enactments depend on an expansive reading of congressional
commerce power.").
216. See, e.g., National Ass'n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir.
1997) (upholding § 9(a)(1) of the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)
(1994)), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 2340 (1998); United States v. Olin, Corp., 107 F.3d 1506
(11th Cir. 1997) (reversing the district court and upholding the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9601-9675
(West 1995 & Supp. 1998)); United States v. Bramble, 103 F.3d 1475, 1480-82 (9th Cir.
1996) (upholding the Eagle Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. § 668 (1994)); United States v.
Romano, 929 F. Supp. 502, 507-09 (D. Mass. 1996) (upholding the Lacey Act, 16 U.S.C.
§§ 3371-3378 (1994), a federal wildlife protection statute), rev'd on other grounds, 137
F.3d 677 (1st Cir. 1998).
217. 127 F.3d 343 (4th Cir. 1997). The panel consisted of Circuit Judges Ervin and
Motz, and District Court Judge Blake sitting by designation. See id.
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wastewater treatment and oil reclamation business in Charlotte,
North Carolina.218  Defendants' operations involved accepting
industrial wastewater and oil, processing the oil for reuse, and
treating the wastewater prior to its discharge into a public sewer.219
Defendants' discharges were carried via the sewer to the Irwin Creek
Sewage Treatment Plant operated by the Charlotte-Mecklenberg
Utility Department ("CMUD"). Water treated at this sewage plant
was then discharged, flowing into the Irwin Creek and in turn flowing
into the Catawba River, which crosses into South Carolina and finally
empties into the Atlantic Ocean2 0 Pursuant to investigations by
both the Federal Bureau of Investigation and CMUD, it was
discovered that defendants were discharging excessive levels of toxic
substances, including cadmium, chromium, copper, lead, nickel, and
zinc, in violation of its pretreatment permits." The illegal disposal
methods employed by defendants involved intentionally bypassing
treatment and monitoring devices.' As a result, pollutants were
discharged directly into the sewer line, often under the cover of
darkness.223 Defendants were convicted of conspiracy and several
counts of knowingly violating the relevant pretreatment standards,
resulting in over $50,000 in fines and probation for the corporate
defendant, and fines and fifty-one month sentences for the individual
defendants.224
On appeal, defendants challenged the constitutionality of the
Act based on the Lopez decision.' The Fourth Circuit found the
argument to be without merit, holding that "Congress clearly
intended to regulate pollutant discharge into sewer systems and other
nonnavigable waters through the [Act], and that Congress has the
constitutional authority to do so."" The court drew support from
cases pre-dating Lopez, such as Riverside Bayview Homes.2 7
218. See id. at 346.
219. See id.
220. See id.
221. See id. at 346-47.
222. See id. at 347. Such "bypass" methods included discharging untreated wastewater
directly into the sewer by means of a tank equipped with a special valve for rapid
discharge and even directing employees to pump wastewater through the employees'
toilet. See id.
223. See id.
224. See id.
225. See id. at 348. Defendants also raised a barrage of challenges ranging from
violations of due process to erroneous rulings, all found to be without merit. See id. at
349-54.
226. Id.
227. See id. (citing United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121
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Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit rejected defendants' claim that
Lopez rendered the Act unconstitutional, denying that "Lopez is a
radical sea change which invalidates the decades of Commerce
Clause analysis" and declared that the Act is "certainly a valid
exercise of Congressional power."'
The only other circuit to have addressed the extent of the
definition of "waters of the United States" prior to Wilson is the
Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Eidson. 9 Similar to Hartsell,
defendants were officers of an oil reclamation and industrial
wastewater treatment business. 0 Defendants routinely engaged in
illegal discharges of industrial wastewater, going to great lengths to
conceal their activities from environmental regulators. 1  One
evening, defendants were caught pumping a "sludge substance"
containing a number of toxic pollutants directly into a storm sewer
when a police officer chanced upon them. 2  The storm sewer
emptied into an open drainage ditch which fed into a drainage
canal.?3 This canal then flowed into a creek which in turn emptied
into Tampa Bay.?3 4  Defendants were convicted of knowingly
violating the Act. 5
The challenge to the Act in Eidson differed somewhat from the
challenges in Hartsell and Wilson. The Eidson defendants challenged
not the Act itself, nor the specific wording of any regulations, but
rather the finding that the specific drainage ditch in question was a
"navigable water" within the meaning of § 1362(7).P6 The Eidson
(1985)).
228. Id. at 348 n.1 (citing United States v. Eidson, 108 F.3d 1336, 1341 (11th Cir.
1997)). The Wilson court never addressed Hartsell in its opinion-perhaps because the
Wilson oral arguments were heard prior to the written opinion in Hartsell. See Wilson,
133 F.3d at 251; Hartsell, 127 F.3d at 343.
229. 108 F.3d 1336 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 248, and cert. denied, 118 S. Ct.
578 (1997).
230. See id. at 1340.
231. As in Hartsell, the violations in Eidson were egregious, including dumping
industrial waste directly onto bushes and woods in an adjacent lot, keeping fraudulent
inventory documents that recorded the illegal discharges as being stored in a fictitious
"Tank 8," and importing truckloads of dirt to conceal soil contamination in anticipation of
visits from inspectors. See id.
232. See id. at 1340.
233. See id. at 1342.
234. See id.
235. See id. at 1340. These are the same statutes under which the Wilson defendants
were convicted. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. The Eidson defendants were
also found guilty of three counts of mail fraud for falsely assuring their customers that
they were disposing of the wastewater in compliance with all relevant environmental laws,
regulations, and permits. See Eidson, 108 F.3d at 1340.
236. See Eidson, 108 F.3d at 1341.
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court emphasized that "waters of the United States" was broadly
defined and included waters that were not literally navigable.2 7
Given this broad definition of "waters of the United States," the
Eleventh Circuit had no problem determining that the ditch in
question was a navigable water within the purview of § 1362(7),
despite the fact that it was not navigable in fact, was man-made, and
flowed only intermittently.238
Immediately after Lopez, the Supreme Court had a chance to
address the constitutionality of the "other waters" provision at issue
in Wilson, but declined to do so in Cargill, Inc. v. United States. 9
The facts leading up to this opportunity focus on the activities of the
Leslie Salt Company ("Leslie Salt"), which was the owner of a tract
of land near San Francisco, California. Leslie Salt used the property
for the manufacture of salt until 1959.240 This tract of land contained
pits used to collect calcium chloride and shallow basins used for
crystallizing the salt.241 During most of the year, these pits and basins
were dry, but during the winter and spring, they collected rainwater,
forming temporary ponds.242 In 1985, Leslie Salt began digging a
feeder ditch and a siltation pond, discharging fill that affected the
seasonally-ponded areas.243
In order to stop these activities, the Corps issued a cease and
desist order pursuant to § 404 of the Act.244 Leslie Salt filed suit
challenging the Corps's jurisdiction over the temporary ponds and
initially was successful in Leslie Salt Co. v. United States ("Leslie Salt
/-).245 In Leslie Salt I, the district court found that the temporary
ponds were not "waters of the United States" because, in part, they
were not "other waters" under § 328.3(a)(3); they were man-made
and dry much of the year.246 On appeal in Leslie Salt Co. v. United
237. See id. at 1341 (citing United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S.
121, 133 (1985)). In Eidson, the Eleventh Circuit referred approvingly to an EPA
regulation defining "waters of the United States" identically to § 328.3 at issue in Wilson
as "[i]n accordance with this legislative intent." Id. However, the particular part of the
regulation at issue in Eidson covered "tributaries to waters that 'may be susceptible to use
in interstate or foreign commerce.'" Id. (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(s) (1997)). This part
of the definition was not in controversy in Wilson. See Wilson, 133 F.3d at 257-58.
238. See Eidson, 108 F.3d at 1341-43.
239. 516 U.S. 955 (1995).
240. See Leslie Salt Co. v. United States ("Leslie Salt IV") 55 F.3d 1388,1390 (9th Cir.
1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 955 (1995).
241. See id.
242. See id. at 1391.
243. See id.
244. See id.
245. 700 F. Supp. 476 (N.D. Cal. 1989), rev'd, 896 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1990).
246. See id. at 485.
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States ("Leslie Salt IP"), 247 however, the Ninth Circuit held that these
qualities did not exclude the ponds from the category of "other
waters."' 4 Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit held that the fact that the
ponds might serve as a habitat for migratory birds or endangered
species may provide a sufficient connection to interstate commerce
under the so-called "migratory bird rule."249 Accordingly, the Ninth
Circuit reversed and remanded for a factual determination with
respect to whether a sufficient connection to interstate commerce
was present 50 On remand, the district court in Leslie Salt Co. v.
United States ("Leslie Salt III")z ' found a sufficient connection to
interstate commerce because fifty-five species of migratory birds
used the temporary ponds as a habitat"5 2 Leslie Salt was accordingly
assessed civil penalties and required to restore the property to its
preexisting condition. 3
Cargill, Inc., the successor corporation to Leslie Salt, raised the
next appeal in Leslie Salt Co. v. United States ("Leslie Salt IV"),2 4
arguing, among other issues, that the extent of jurisdiction under the
Act as applied in the "migratory bird rule" exceeded the bounds of
the Commerce Clause55  Because this issue had already been
litigated in the Ninth Circuit in Leslie Salt II, the court held that the
"law of the case" applied to this claim and that, consequently, Cargill
would have to show that the Leslie Salt II holding was clearly
erroneous.5 6 The Ninth Circuit admitted that "[t]he migratory bird
rule certainly tests the limits of Congress's commerce powers and,
some would argue, the bounds of reason," but held that the Leslie
247. 896 F.2d 354,359-60 (9th Cir. 1990).
248. Id. at 359-60.
249. See id. at 360. The migratory bird rule, found in the Discussion of Public
Comments and Changes section of the Corps's final regulation, indicates that:
[W]aters of the United States at 40 CFR 328.3(a)(3) also include the following
waters:
a. Which are or would be used as habitat by birds protected by Migratory
Bird Treaties; or
b. Which are or would be used as habitat by other migratory birds which
cross state lines; or
c. Which are or would be used as habitat for endangered species; or
d. Used to irrigate crops sold in interstate commerce.
Final Rule for Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 51 Fed. Reg. 41,206,
41,217 (1986).
250. Leslie Salt II, 896 F.2d at 361.
251. 820 F. Supp. 478 (N.D. Cal. 1992), aff'd in part, 55 F.3d 1388 (1995).
252. See Leslie Salt IV, 55 F.3d 1388, 1392 (referring to Leslie Salt III).
253. See id.
254. 55 F.3d 1388 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 955 (1995).
255. See id. at 1395.
256. See id. at 1393,1395.
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Salt II holding was not "clearly erroneous" given the breadth of the
Commerce Clause. 7
The Leslie Salt IV decision was handed down about a month
after Lopez, but the case was argued in 1994, prior to Lopez, and
Lopez is not discussed anywhere in the opinion."8 Cargill petitioned
for certiorari which was denied in Cargill, Inc. v. United States.-5 9 In a
rare, written dissent from a denial of certiorari, Justice Thomas,
relying on Lopez, roundly condemned the "migratory bird rule" as
well as the Corps regulations. 210 He specifically pointed out that the
"other waters" provision of § 328.3(a)(3) did not premise jurisdiction
on a substantial effect on interstate commerce, but rather required
only that the activity "could affect" interstate commerce. 6' Justice
Thomas also pointed out that the migratory bird rule parallels the
uncertain "could affect" language of the "other waters" provision,
extending jurisdiction to waters that could potentially serve as a
habitat for migratory birds.26 2 He believed that such an application of
these regulations was improper because it is based on the erroneous
assumption that "self-propelled flight of birds across state lines
creates a sufficient interstate nexus to justify the Corps's assertion of
jurisdiction over any standing water that could serve as a habitat for
migratory birds."'263  Such an expansive interpretation, Justice
Thomas believed, "stretches Congress's Commerce Clause powers
beyond the breaking point. ''264
Lopez raises questions as to the constitutionality of the Act and
the corresponding body of regulations promulgated thereunder. The
Wilson case highlights the vulnerability of an important part of the
Act-the § 404 permit program.265 In light of Wilson, several
questions remain. The first question is one explicitly avoided by the
Wilson defendants, namely: Is there anything in the Act itself that is
problematic given the limitation placed on the commerce power by
257. Id. at 1396.
258. See id. at 1388, 1395-96.
259. 516 U.S. 955 (1995).
260. See id. at 957-59 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Note that a denial of certiorari is not
intended to express the Court's views as to either the validity of its jurisdiction or the
merits of the case, but rather merely reflects the Court's "discretionary refusal" to review
the lower court's decision. See ROBERT L. STERN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACICE
§ 5.7, at 268 (7th ed. 1993).
261. See id. at 958 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
262. See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
263. 1d (Thomas, J., dissenting).
264. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
265. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1994).
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Lopez?266 If not, would the Supreme Court agree with the Fourth
Circuit's assessment that the "other waters" provision of § 328.3(a) of
the Corps's regulations exceeds the bounds of the Act and
Constitution?2 67 Finally, if the "other waters" provision is found to
be an unconstitutional application of the Act by the Supreme Court,
how might it be changed in order to comply with Lopez and what
possible effects might such a change bring.?
261
The short answer to these questions seems to be that there is
nothing unconstitutional in the Act itself. Moreover, even if the
Supreme Court concludes that the "other waters" provision as it
stands exceeds Congress's commerce power, a simple rewording of
§ 328.3(a)(3) would bring the regulation back within the limits of
Lopez. The actual impact of such a change in the courts may be
increased litigation regarding the scope of the reworded regulation.
The jurisdictional foundation for the § 404 permit program and
the prohibition against "discharges of pollutants" is Congress's power
to regulate "navigable waters. '269 The regulation of navigable waters
has been a traditional object of the commerce power dating back to
Justice Marshall's venerable Gibbons opinion. 270 As the Wilson court
recognizes, the power to regulate waters navigable in fact is
indisputable.27' A question arises, however, when considering the
significance of Congress's definition of "navigable waters" as "waters
of the United States."'272 The Court has stated that the use of this
definition of navigable waters reflects Congress's desire to extend the
jurisdiction of the Act broadly.27 Accordingly, the term " 'navigable'
as used in the Act is of limited import," as the Act was intended to
cover "at least some waters that would not be deemed 'navigable'
under the classical understanding of that term." 274 The Court's clear
approval of this expansive interpretation in Riverside Bayview
Homes, combined with the fact that six-if not eight-members of
the Lopez Court seem unwilling to upset holdings such as Riverside
266. See infra notes 269-87 and accompanying text. The Fourth Circuit could not resist
speculating on the issue in a cursory fashion. See supra notes 131-36 and accompanying
text.
267. See infra notes 288-342 and accompanying text.
268. See infra notes 343-64 and accompanying text.
269. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1344(a), 1362(12) (1994).
270. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 22 (1824).
271. See Wilson, 133 F.3d at 256.
272. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7).
273. See United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 133 (1985).
274. Id.
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Bayview Homes,275 make the regulation of non-navigable waters not
problematic under current Commerce Clause jurisprudence. The
Wilson defendants probably believed this to be the case as well.276
While the Wilson court pointed out that there are limits to this
reasoning and those limits are presently unclear,277 the Fourth Circuit
also has said that Lopez has not worked a "sea change" upon earlier
Commerce Clause jurisprudence or the Act, which is still clearly
viable today.278 The Act itself provides no further guidance, as
"waters of the United States" has no substantive meaning beyond,
perhaps, that it must mean something different from "navigable
waters." The Court determined in Riverside Bayview Homes that this
difference is that "waters of the United States" is broader than just
waters navigable in fact.279
In the context of the § 404 permit program, Congress leaves it to
the Corps to supply the substance for the phrase "waters of the
United States." 0 In its regulations, the Corps has provided a very
detailed-but very broad-definition of what "waters of the United
States" means in terms of the physical world.281 The crux of any
constitutional problems must, therefore, reside in this regulation,
which was the point of attack for the Wilson defendantsm Section
328.3(a) of the Corps's regulations defines three primary types of
275. Justice Thomas is the only Justice who clearly favors reconsidering this century's
Commerce Clause jurisprudence. See supra notes 203-07 and accompanying text.
Obviously, as demonstrated by their dissent in Lopez, Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg,
and Breyer prefer expansive Commerce Clause jurisprudence with great deference to
Congress on the issue. See supra notes 208-14 and accompanying text. Justices Kennedy
and O'Connor, the key swing votes in Lopez, also seem unlikely to disturb a holding such
as Riverside Bayview Homes. In their concurring opinion, they emphasized the
importance of stare decisis and expressly affirmed earlier cases upholding a broad
application of the commerce power. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 573-74
(1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring). Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia fall
somewhere between the two concurring opinions. The majority opinion in Lopez, written
by the Chief Justice and joined by Justice Scalia, implicitly approved of some prior,
notably expansive, Commerce Clause decisions, such as Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v.
United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964), in outlining the proper objects of congressional
regulation under the Commerce Clause. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59. Furthermore, the
Chief Justice joined the majority in Riverside Bayview Homes, which was a unanimous
decision. See Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 122.
276. Otherwise, presumably, they also would have challenged the Act itself.
277. See Wilson, 133 F.3d at 256.
278. See United States v. Hartsell, 127 F.3d 343, 348 n.1 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied,
118 S. Ct. 1321 (1998).
279. See Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 133.
280. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a), (d) (1994); 33 C.F.R. § 328 (1997).
281. See 33 C.F.R. § 328. This laundry list of applicable waters is provided in 33 C.F.R.
§ 328.3. See supra note 130 (listing applicable waters).
282. See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
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waters.8 3  The first category is essentially waters "navigable in
fact." '  The second category encompasses waters, including
wetlands, that span more than one state.285 The third and most
problematic category is the "other waters" provision, which covers
intrastate bodies of water, the "use, degradation or destruction of
which could affect interstate or foreign commerce." 6  It is this
provision that gives the § 404 permit program the broad reach
necessary to cover such "waters" as isolated wetlands. The very
language of the "other waters" provision indicates that no actual
connection to interstate commerce must exist, only a potential one.
Thus, because the provision does not require an actual connection to
interstate commerce, the Fourth Circuit held that § 328.3(a) could
not survive a Commerce Clause challenge and thus was not
authorized by the Act. 7
The most important question the Wilson case raises is what the
Supreme Court would do with the "other waters" provision. The
uncertain state of Commerce Clause jurisprudence following Lopez
makes it difficult to predict how the Court would rule on the issue
presented in Wilson. When the separate opinions in Lopez are
examined, however, some predictions can be made. Outcomes based
on the extreme positions in Lopez are fairly easy to predict. Justice
Thomas has already shown his inclination. In his vigorous dissent
from the denial of certiorari in Cargill, he roundly condemned the
"other waters" provision and especially its application in the
migratory bird rule.8 Justice Breyer's dissent basically favored the
status quo: deference to Congress and a Commerce Clause with
theoretical limits that Congress has never reached.289 Thus, it is safe
to assume that the dissenters in Lopez would uphold the "other
283. In addition to the three main categories of waters, § 328.3(a) includes tributaries
of these waters, see 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(5), wetlands adjacent to these waters, see id.
§ 328.3(a)(7), territorial seas, see id. § 328.3(a)(6), and impoundments of water that
otherwise meet the definition of waters of the United States, see id. § 328.3(a)(4).
284. See id. § 328.3(a)(1).
285. See id. § 328.3(a)(2).
286. Id. § 328.3(a)(3).
287. See Wilson, 133 F.3d at 257.
288. See Cargill, Inc. v. United States, 516 U.S. 955, 956-59 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
289. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 616-17, 624 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see
also supra notes 208-14 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Breyer's dissent in
Lopez). Justice Breyer believed that upholding § 922(q) would not eliminate the
distinction between what is truly local and what is truly national, see Lopez, 514 U.S. at
624 (Breyer, J., dissenting), but Chief Justice Rehnquist pointed out that Justice Breyer is
"unable to identify any activity that the States may regulate but Congress may not." Id.
at 564.
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waters" provision, possibly relying heavily on the "cumulative effect"
principle Justice Breyer referred to in his dissent.2 0 The tally at this
point is likely to be four in favor of upholding the "other waters"
provision and one clearly against.291
Predicting what the rest of the Court would do with the "other
waters" provision is more difficult. It is therefore necessary to
examine how the "other waters" provision may be analyzed under
Lopez. Lopez outlines three major categories of activity that may be
regulated by Congress pursuant to the Commerce Clause: (1)
channels of interstate commerce; (2) instrumentalities or persons or
things in interstate commerce; and (3) those activities that
substantially affect interstate commerce. 9 While regulation of some
waters that would qualify as "other waters" under § 328.3(a)(3) could
be regulated under the first two categories, the "other waters"
provision itself does not relate to the channels or instrumentalities of
commerce per se. If we consider that it is the navigable waters
themselves that are the channels or instrumentalities of interstate
commerce-an assumption the Wilson court seemed willing to
considerz9 3-then the "other waters" provision does not appear to
satisfy the first category because that category does not require that
the regulated waters have any connection to navigable waters.2 94
Also, it might be reasonable to consider water a "thing" in interstate
commerce and, therefore, any waters that are interstate in nature or
flow into interstate waters may satisfy this category.295 Again,
however, the "other waters" provision does not require that the
regulated waters have any interstate qualities in this sense. Thus, the
"other waters" provision does not appear to fit into the second
category either. The only remaining option is to consider whether
the "other waters" provision extends jurisdiction of the Act to cover
activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.
The "substantially affects" category discussed in Lopez is
290. See id. at 616 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
291. The prediction is that Justice Breyer, along with Justices Stevens, Souter, and
Ginsburg, who joined Justice Breyer's dissent in Lopez, would favor upholding the
regulation. Justice Thomas likely would oppose upholding the regulation.
292. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59.
293. See Wilson, 133 F.3d at 256; see also Johnson, supra note 5, at 69 (considering this
possibility).
294. See supra notes 123-36 and accompanying text.
295. The Wilson court implied that water may be a "thing" in interstate commerce
when it expressed a possibility that Congress might be able to regulate waters that flow
across state lines. See Wilson, 133 F.3d at 256. For further discussion of this possibility,
see infra notes 361-64 and accompanying text.
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particularly relevant because the "other waters" provision is drafted
in terms of effects upon interstate commerce. To extend jurisdiction
of the Act to a given body of water, the "other waters" provision
requires only the mere possibility that the "use, degradation or
destruction" of such a body of water could affect interstate
commerce.296 The provision provides three examples of such waters:
(1) where interstate travelers could use waters for recreation or other
purposes; (2) where fish or shellfish could be taken from waters and
sold in interstate commerce; and (3) where waters could be used for
industrial purposes by industries engaged in interstate commerce.297
In addition, in the preamble to § 328 in the Federal Register, the
Corps gives another example of what it believes to be included in the
"other waters" provision: the migratory bird rule, which extends
jurisdiction to waters that could be used by birds protected by
migratory bird treaties or by migratory birds that cross state lines.298
The wording of the "other waters" provision alone might be
enough to render it unconstitutional under Lopez. The majority
opinion in Lopez went to some trouble to spell out the requirement
that an activity must "substantially affect interstate commerce." 299
Therefore, a regulation that premises jurisdiction on a possible effect
on interstate commerce seems to conflict directly with Lopez.' This
is certainly the view of Justice Thomas, who believes that a "could
affect" test does not require that an activity substantially affect
interstate commerce. 10' This is also, of course, the view of the Fourth
Circuit in Wilson.31 However, eight members of the Supreme Court
296. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3) (1997); supra note 130 (providing text of the "other
waters" provision).
297. See 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3)(i), (ii), & (iii) (1997).
298. See Final Rule for Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 51 Fed. Reg.
41,206, 41,217 (1986); supra note 249 (listing the migratory bird rule).
299. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,559 (1995).
300. See id. at 559 ("We conclude ... that the proper test requires an analysis of
whether the regulated activity 'substantially affects' interstate commerce.").
301. See Cargill v. United States, 516 U.S. 955,958 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
302. Whether the panel that heard Hartsell would come out the same way is not clear.
It is significant to note that the Hartsell court did not address the other waters provision
or any other Corps regulations, but only vaguely addressed a generalized challenge to the
Act itself. See United States v. Hartsell, 127 F.3d 343 (4th Cir. 1997).
Furthermore, the defendants in Hartsell committed far more egregious acts than
those in Wilson, dumping toxic chemicals directly into a sewer which flowed eventually
into navigable waters. See Hartsell, 127 F.3d at 346-47. In contrast, the Wilson
defendants were trying to fill isolated wetlands with dirt in a manner that they claimed
they thought to be in accordance with law. See Wilson, 133 F.3d at 254-55. Thus, in
Hartsell the connection to navigable waters-and hence interstate commerce-was much
more direct, and the actions by the defendants were clearly more directly harmful. See
Hartsell, 127 F.3d at 346.
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have yet to voice an opinion on the wording of the "other waters"
provision.
To determine how the remainder of the Court would decide the
issue, it is necessary to look beyond the statute's wording. In
analyzing what activities have a substantial effect on commerce, the
Lopez Court highlighted several factors as important. The first is
whether the statute has a jurisdictional element that would enable a
case-by-case inquiry as to whether interstate commerce was
implicated.3 0 3 The second is whether the activity is commercial in
nature, including whether it is part of a larger economic regulatory
scheme.30 The third is whether federalism concerns are raised by the
statute. 05
In analyzing the "other waters" provision in light of these
factors, it is worth considering whether the provision has a
jurisdictional component. In fact, the entire "other waters" provision
is a jurisdictional component. It premises jurisdiction on the
condition that the use, degradation, or destruction of a body of water
could affect interstate commerce. 6 The "other waters" provision
goes so far as to provide concrete examples of this jurisdictional
component in the context of recreation, fishing, and industry.3 7 This
alone clearly enables a case-by-case inquiry, but the "could affect"
language takes us right back to the beginning. Depending on how the
Court treats this language, the jurisdictional component may be
found insufficient. If the jurisdictional component itself is premised
on a potential, and not actual, effect on interstate commerce, then
Congress has drafted a jurisdictional component that cannot
withstand constitutional scrutiny due to the "other waters" provision.
Similar difficulties are encountered when considering whether
the "other waters" provision extends jurisdiction to regulate activities
that are commercial in character. Again, the "could affect" language
implies that in any given instance there may be no relevant economic
activity at issue. The nature of the activity regulated, however, must
be examined in its entirety, not just individual instances.0 8 A strong
303. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561-62.
304. See id. at 561.
305. See id. at 564-68 (discussing concerns of general federal police powers and state
sovereignty).
306. See 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3) (1997).
307. See id.
308. Each Justice on the Lopez Court recognized this principle to some degree except
Justice Thomas, who, despite joining the majority, took issue with the concept. See
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558; id. at 616 (Breyer, J., dissenting); id. at 600 (Thomas, J.,
concurring) ("The aggregation principle is clever, but has no stopping point.").
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argument can be made that while the "other waters" provision does
not require a substantial effect on interstate commerce in any
particular instance, the aggregate of these instances will produce a
substantial effect on interstate commerce.30 9 If all isolated wetlands
are filled and developed, the consequences for the environment may
be substantial, and, given the importance of natural resources to the
national economy, produce a subsequent substantial impact on
interstate commerce.3 10 This argument, however, is strikingly similar
to the argument that the education of children, in the aggregate, is
substantially related to the economic well-being of the nation, and
this argument was rejected by the Court in Lopez. The Lopez
majority described the difference between Wickard and Lopez:
Congress may not use a "relatively trivial impact on commerce as an
excuse for broad general regulation of state or private activities," but
where a "general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to
commerce, the de minimis character of individual instances arising
under that statute is of no consequence. 3 12
The question then is whether, in the isolated wetland context,
309. The Court followed this principle in Wickard, which the majority in Lopez cited
with tacit approval. See id. at 559-60 (citing Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942)).
310. See Chertok, supra note 95, at 863 (listing functions that wetlands perform);
Stephen M. Johnson, Federal Regulation of Isolated Wetlands, 23 ENVTL. L. 1, 38-39
(1993) (discussing the aggregate effect of destruction of wetlands); Karkkainen, supra
note 6, at 62-63 (listing the functions wetlands perform); Warner, supra note 6, at 352-53
(making this argument specifically for migratory birds). Also, concepts such as
biodiversity and ecosystems, which are based on the idea that the whole is larger than the
sum of its parts and which focus on the value of the diversity and interconnectivity of
living things, are gaining acceptance in environmental law. These ideas are particularly
relevant to the Endangered Species Act ("ESA"), but they are also logically relevant to
laws such as the § 404 permit program, which is integral in protecting unique habitats such
as wetlands. In National Association of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041 (D.C.
Cir. 1997), the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals relied on biodiversity in
finding a connection between the destruction of an endangered species' habitat, the
"taking" of an endangered species prohibited under § 9(a)(1) of the ESA, and interstate
commerce. At issue in National Association of Home Builders was the habitat of the
Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly. See id. at 1043. The evidence showed that there are less
than 300 of these flies capable of breeding in the world, all located within an eight mile
radius in Southern California. See id.; id. at 1060 (Sentelle, J., dissenting). To avoid
violations of the ESA for interfering with the fly's habitat, San Bernardino County was
forced to relocate a planned hospital at a cost to taxpayers of approximately $3.5 million.
See id. at 1060 (Sentelle, J., dissenting). Despite the fly's limited range, the court
determined that the loss of biodiversity itself would have a substantial impact on the
ecosystem, which in turn has a substantial effect on interstate commerce. See id. at 1052-
54. For an overview of biodiversity concepts in environmental law, see generally Oliver
A. Houck, On the Law of Biodiversity and Ecosystem Management, 81 MINN. L. REv. 869
(1997), and Karkkainen, supra note 6.
311. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 616,618-25 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
312. Id. at 558 (citing Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 197 n.27 (1968)).
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Congress is using a tenuous connection to interstate commerce to
regulate private or state activities or whether Congress is regulating
something substantially related to interstate commerce-even though
in some instances the effect of an individual violation is of a de
minimis character. The only guidepost is Lopez. While wetlands
destruction presumably can have an enormous impact on commerce,
can it reasonably be argued that the effect on commerce is any
greater than that of education?313 Perhaps the more appropriate
question is whether the § 404 permit program more closely resembles
the regulatory scheme controlling wheat prices in Wickard or the
possession of a gun near a school? In some respects, regulation of
wetlands seems to have a more indirect effect on commerce, similar
to the effect of education on commerce, than the direct control of the
market value of a nationally traded, fungible commodity such as
wheat. On the other hand, underlying the controversy surrounding
wetlands regulation clearly is an economic issue. Fortunes may be at
stake in developing wetlands, 314 and, consequently, it is no surprise
that sizable business entities are frequently the defendants in § 404
cases.315 Wilson is a perfect example-he was an experienced and
313. Furthermore, the aggregation principle suffers logical shortcomings when
considered from a Tenth Amendment perspective. Professor Epstein has argued that
where the state interest outweighs the federal interest in one instance, it should still
outweigh it when multiplied by a large number of cases. See Epstein, supra note 5, at 186.
Yet aggregation is never employed in this fashion. It is only used on the federal side of
the equation.
314. See Robert D. Sokolove & P. Robert Thompson, From the Environment: The
Future of Wetland Regulation Is Here, 23 REAL EST. L.J. 78, 78 (1994) ("Wetlands
regulations... have a profound impact on the economy of the entire nation, not merely
one industry. Any business or industry involved with real estate or land is affected by this
issue."); see also Michael C. Blumm & D. Bernard Zaleha, Federal Wetlands Protection
Under the Clean Water Act: Regulatory Ambivalence, Intergovernmental Tension, and a
Call for Reform, 60 U. COLO. L. REV. 695, 697 (1989) ("Since wetlands often supply
attractive sites for industrial, agricultural, and residential developments, wetland owners
have strong economic incentives to replace wetlands with airports, port facilities, soybean
fields, and shoreland housing."); David A. Westbrook, Liberal Environmental
Jurisprudence, 27 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 619, 691 (1994) ("In general, environmental law is
fought on the terrain of economics.").
315. For example, agribusiness giant Cargill, the petitioner in Cargill, Inc. v. United
States, 516 U.S. 955 (1995), is the nation's largest privately-owned company, holding eight
billion dollars in assets. See Giant Cargill Resists Pressure to Go Public as it Pursues
Growth, WALL ST. J., Jan. 9, 1997, at Al; see also Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc. v.
United States, 474 U.S. 121 (1985) (involving developer of subdivision); Wilson, 133 F.3d
at 254 (noting that defendant Interstate General had over $100 million in assets);
Hoffman Homes, Inc. v. U.S. EPA, 999 F.2d 256 (1993) (involving developer of
subdivision). Accordingly, it generally is not the average homeowner installing a deck in
his backyard who is pressing his case to the appellate level in federal court. But the
average property owner has been caught in the crossfire. United States v. Mills, 817 F.
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sophisticated developer who had ample warning that he might run
into legal difficulties in developing the wetland parcels, yet he
continued filling the parcels.316 Although in the end Mr. Wilson was
correct that the Corps had no jurisdiction over his parcels, it is
difficult to explain why he would risk the violation in the absence of
monetary gain.
After a point, the debate regarding what is and what is not
economic in character begins to resemble pre-Jones & Laughlin Steel
thinking on whether something has a direct or indirect effect on
commerce. 317  Justice Kennedy seems to capture the unavoidable
paradox in his concurring opinion in Lopez: "In a sense any conduct
in this interdependent world of ours has an ultimate commercial
origin or consequence," 31 8 yet "content-based boundaries used
without more" are imprecise. 3 '9  Nonetheless, the inquiry as to
whether an activity is commercial in nature is once again relevant
after Lopez.32°
Because it is hard to draw the line strictly in terms of how
substantial an effect is on interstate commerce, it is appropriate to
examine whether the § 404 permit program intrudes on a traditional
area of state sovereignty. The issue of federalism is a significant
factor in both the Lopez majority opinion and Justice Kennedy's
concurrence. Justice Kennedy actually hinges his entire decision on
Supp. 1546 (N.D. Fla. 1993), affd, 36 F.3d 1052 (11th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S.
1112 (1995), is an outrageous example of this problem. In Mills, a father and son
purchased two lots of land and placed clean fill dirt on the property in an attempt to
prepare the land for construction. See id. at 1548. The land did not appear to be what the
average person would consider a wetland; it was a wooded lot without any standing water
on it, and it did not appear to be a swamp, marsh, or bog. See id. For these actions,
defendants, who represented themselves at trial, were sentenced to prison for 21 months.
See id.
316. See Wilson, 133 F.3d at 255.
317. See supra notes 146-53 and accompanying text.
318. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 580 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
319. Id. at 574 (Kennedy, I., concurring).
320. The Gun-Free School Zones Act, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (1988 & Supp. V 1993), was
found unconstitutional in part because it had "nothing to do with 'commerce' or any sort
of economic enterprise, however broadly one might define those terms." Lopez, 514 U.S.
at 561; see also Epstein, supra note 5, at 176 ("The earlier understanding was that any
activity that had a substantial effect on commerce was within reach of the federal power:
now it appears that it is only some class of activities that fall under that test, and that
those have to be close to the commercial .... "); Johnson, supra note 5, at 48-49
(speculating that the Court may not defer to Congress when the regulated activity is not
of a commercial character); Warner, supra note 6, at 341 (discussing the possibility that
strict interpretation of Lopez may require that the regulated activity be economic in
character).
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this issue.32 Whether the § 404 permit program intrudes on a
traditional area of state sovereignty depends on how the program is
characterized. In some respects, it amounts to mere land use
regulation or zoning. In this case, it could be argued that zoning or
land use is an area traditionally reserved to the states;322 however, this
particular argument has been rejected by the Supreme Court. 3
Additionally, the § 404 permit program has goals much broader in
scope than zoning or land use regulation. The Act as a whole seeks
to "restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological
integrity of the Nation's waters, '324 and the § 404 permit program is
an integral part of this bigger picture.325 The Act's mandate and the
scope of problems the Act was designed to remedy make zoning a
poor analogy even if land regulation is involved. A better argument
is that environmental legislation is sui generis and by its very nature
has always been in the domain of the federal government 2.3  Even
though there was some state environmental regulation prior to this
federal regime, the states' efforts reflected a laissez-faire attitude
321. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 574-83 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (discussing the
importance of the federal balance and how the Gun-Free School Zones Act upset this
balance).
322. Or at least delegated to municipalities by the state. One of the major reasons the
wetlands protection provisions of the Clean Water Act and the Endangered Species Act
have attracted some public animosity is because they regulate land use by private
individuals. See Johnson, supra note 5, at 59-60.
323. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 275-76
(1981). Two key issues for the Hodel Court in upholding provisions of the Surface Mining
Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-87, 91 Stat. 445 (codified as
amended at 30 U.S.C.A § 1201-1328 (West 1986 & Supp. 1998)), were preventing a race
to the bottom between states with respect to environmental laws and the fact that
environmental hazards may affect more than one state. See id. at 281-82. For a
discussion of these "race to the bottom" concerns with respect to environmental laws, see
Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is There a "Race" and Is It "to
the Bottom"?, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271 (1997); see also Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating
Interstate Competition: Rethinking the "Race to the Bottom" Rationale for Federal
Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210, 1212-13 (1992) (arguing that
proponents of the "race-to-the-bottom" theory should be required to "demonstrate the
analytical validity of their arguments"); Joshua D. Sarnoff, The Continuing Imperative
(but Only from a National Perspective) for Federal Environmental Protection, 7 DUKE
ENVrL. L. & POL'Y F. 225, 278-85 (1997) (commenting that "race-to-the-bottom" is an
argument for federal environmental regulation).
324. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1994).
325. See Chertok, supra note 95, at 864 (noting that § 404 is the "primary basis" for
federal wetland regulation).
326. Some commentators argue that the federal government is best-suited to deal with
environmental issues. See Oliver A. Houck & Michael Rolland, Federalism in Wetlands
Regulation: A Consideration of Delegation of Clean Water Act Section 404 and Related
Programs to the States, 54 MD. L. Rnv. 1242, 1244-53 (1995) (making the case for Federal
involvement); Sarnoff, supra note 323, at 230-31.
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towards the environment and were not comprehensive in scope.27
Furthermore, after twenty-five years of extensive federal regulation
of wetlands, it is hard to argue that the federal government is
upsetting the traditional federal balance by intruding into traditional
state sovereignty.328 Thus, the Tenth Amendment concerns present
in Lopez may not be an issue with the Act or the § 404 permit
program.
Federalism may be the key issue in determining whether the
Court would uphold the "other waters" provision. Given that the
majority opinion in Lopez did not directly discuss federalism nearly
as extensively Justice Kennedy's concurrence, Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Scalia, although expressing concerns about
intrusions on state sovereignty, appear likely to focus on a specific
activity's relation to interstate commerce in determining whether the
commerce power has been exceeded.329 Accordingly, they may be,
after Justice Thomas, the justices most demanding in assessing the
"other waters" provision's link to interstate commerce and,
consequently, the least likely to find the provision constitutional
under Lopez. Justices Kennedy and O'Connor, however, will be
likely to uphold the provision if it is determined consistent with the
federal system: federalism was the key to their votes in Lopez,330
they find substantive definitions of commerce problematic, and they
expressed an unwillingness to disturb prior Commerce Clause
jurisprudence. Because four justices have already indicated a
predisposition to uphold a regulation such as the "other waters"
provision, 331 the addition of the votes of Justices Kennedy or
O'Connor is enough to constitute a majority of the Court. A caveat
must be reiterated, however: Even if regulating isolated wetlands is
327. Prior to the passage of the federal environmental law there was a substantial body
of state law regulating activities that harm the environment, such as the common law
doctrines of nuisance, trespass, negligence, as well as state conservation statutes
protecting wildlife and other natural resources. See Dwyer, supra note 8, at 10,408; see
also Robert V. Percival, Environmental Federalism: Historical Roots and Contemporary
Models, 54 MD. L. REv. 1141, 1144 (1995) (stating that the federal government became
involved in environmental law only after states had failed to do so adequately).
328. See Dwyer, supra note 8, at 10,408. Moreover, most of the major federal
environmental laws target industrial or commercial activity. See Johnson, supra note 5, at
65-66.
329. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-68 (1995); supra notes 174-214 and
accompanying text. Although, Chief Justice Rehnquist certainly was concerned about
preserving the distinction between "what is truly national and what is truly local." See
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567-68.
330. See id. at 568-83 (Kennedy, J., concurring); supra notes 195-202 and
accompanying text.
331. See supra notes 208-14 and accompanying text.
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permissible for many of the reasons discussed above, the "other
waters" provision is worded in a way that seems, on its face, to
directly contradict language that five justices approved in Lopez.32
While the "other waters" provision seems to conflict with Lopez,
the Court had a chance to address this issue in Cargill, but declined to
do so. 333  The Court's decision to deny certiorari is illuminating
because the facts in Cargill were favorable to a finding of no
connection with interstate commerce. The "wetlands" at issue in
Cargill and the Leslie Salt cases334 were old salt pits that were
completely dry much of the year.335 Furthermore, in the Leslie Salt
cases, the only reason wetland plants grew in the first place was
because Leslie Salt was forced to plow the basins to avoid air
pollution violations caused by the dust on the property;336 prior to the
plowing, the ground was too hard and saline to sustain any
vegetation. 37 Finally, in remanding the case, the Ninth Circuit
ordered the district court to consider jurisdiction under the migratory
bird rule,338 which is premised on the notion that migratory bird
habitats may be regulated as part of interstate commerce, because
"'[t]hroughout North America, millions of people annually spend
more than a billion dollars on hunting, trapping, and observing
migratory birds.' ,9 But as Justice Thomas noted, the record
showed that the only people who came to the salt pits to observe the
birds were the government's experts.340 All things considered, it is
332. Compare Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559 (requiring that an activity "substantially affect"
interstate commerce), with 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3) (1997) (premising jurisdiction on
activities which "could affect" interstate commerce).
333. See Cargill, Inc. v. United States, 516 U.S. 955 (1995) (denying certiorari).
334. See supra notes 239-64 and accompanying text.
335. See Leslie Salt 1, 700 F. Supp. 476, 480 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
336. See id.
337. See id.
338. See Leslie Salt I, 896 F.2d 354,360 (9th Cir. 1990).
339. Leslie Salt IV, 55 F.3d 1388, 1395-96 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Hoffman Homes,
Inc. v. U.S. EPA, 999 F.2d 256, 261 (7th Cir. 1993)). In addition to the Ninth and Seventh
Circuits, the Tenth Circuit also has recognized the migratory bird rule. See Utah v.
Marsh, 740 F.2d 799, 804 (10th Cir. 1984) (citing the presence of migratory birds as a
factor in favor of finding jurisdiction prior to the rule's adoption in 1986). The Fourth
Circuit, however, has refused to consider the rule because it is substantive as opposed to
interpretive in nature and was published without heeding the notice and comment
requirements in 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1994). See Tabb Lakes, Ltd. v. United States, 715 F.
Supp. 726,728 (E.D. Va. 1988), aff'dper curiam, 885 F.2d 866 (4th Cir. 1989). For a post-
Wilson case upholding the migratory bird rule, see Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers, 998 F. Supp. 946 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (disagreeing with the reasoning of
the Fourth Circuit in Wilson).
340. See Cargill, Inc. v. United States, 516 U.S. 955, 959 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
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hard to imagine a more tenuous connection to interstate commerce,
yet the Court passed on an opportunity to address both the "other
waters" provision and the migratory bird rule341 This may, of course,
be explained by factors other than the Court's stance towards the
"other waters" provision. First, the Court may be waiting to see how
the other courts of appeals rule on the issue. 42 Second, the denial of
certiorari in Cargill occurred almost six months after the Lopez
decision was handed down. Perhaps the Court was and is proceeding
cautiously given the uproar Lopez has generated.
Even if the "other waters" provision is defective in light of
Lopez, it is, quite possibly, merely an issue of semantics which can be
easily remedied. If the phrase "could affect interstate... commerce"
is replaced with "would substantially affect interstate ... commerce,"
the "other waters" provision's problems under Lopez would be
eliminated. The issue then transforms from the logical to the
practical, shifting the focus from a problem of form to a problem of
substance. The real effect of such a change would likely be massive
litigation to determine whether each and every instance in which an
isolated wetland is used, degraded, or destroyed has a substantial
effect on interstate commerce. The Eidson case presents a scenario
analogous to what the courts will likely confront. There defendants
did not argue that the Act itself exceeded the limits of the
Constitution, but rather that the specific waters in question were
beyond the reach of the Act. 43 In Eidson, defendants argued that the
storm drainage ditch into which they had dumped toxic chemicals
341. Significantly, the relationship between migratory birds and some types of
economic activity has been well-documented. See Johnson, supra note 5, at 38-39 (noting
the billions of dollars of commerce spent on migratory waterfowl). Furthermore, some
commentators argue that looking at economic activity associated with migratory birds at
particular isolated wetlands obscures the big picture. See id. Specifically, destruction of
wetlands where, for example, no hunting takes place will create problems at wetlands
where people do hunt. See id. at 37 (discussing the cumulative effect of destruction of
wetlands); Warner, supra note 6, at 354-55 (same). This does not change the fact that this
would be a most favorable case to discard the rule if the Court were so inclined.
342. See supra note 260 (discussing the significance of a denial of certiorari).
However, the Court has been known to postpone granting certiorari on an issue until
several lower courts are in conflict. See STERN ET AL., supra note 260, § 4.4. at 171. For
example, in a rare opinion supporting a denial of certiorari, Justice Stevens cited a lack of
conflict in the federal courts as a reason to deny certiorari. See McCray v. New York, 461
U.S. 961, 962 (1983). Moreover, Justice Brennan has indicated that there has been a long
tradition of letting "tolerable conflicts" stand until more than two circuits have spoken on
the subject. See William J. Brennan, Jr., Some Thoughts on the Supreme Court's
Workload, 66 JUDIcATURE 230, 233 (1983).
343. See United States v. Eidson, 108 F.3d 1336, 1341 (11th Cir. 1997).
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was not a navigable water within the meaning of the Act.' The
Eleventh Circuit then examined the physical and geographical
qualities of the drainage ditch in question and determined that it was
a navigable water under the Act. 5 In Eidson, this factual analysis of
the ditch's status as a tributary was relatively simple? 46 A parallel
analysis of whether an activity substantially affects interstate
commerce will be far more complex? 47
How much real change from current practices such a rewording
of the "other waters" provision would yield will be in the hands of the
Corps, which controls the permit process, 48 as well as the district
courts, which must make the initial factual determination of what
effects are and are not substantial. Because every piece of property
and every wetland is different, it will take many decisions to shape
the contours of what land falls under the jurisdiction of the Corps
under the § 404 permit program. While there is no guarantee of
significant change, the courts may hold that because the regulation
was reworded, their interpretation must reflect some degree of
change and, consequently, be more restrictive in upholding
344. See id.
345. See id. at 1342-43.
346. See id. at 1342.
347. This complexity results because the analysis of a body of water's status as a
tributary involves a geographic inquiry. Essentially, does drainage ditch A flow into river
B? Obviously, the inquiry can be more complex, but nothing on the order of magnitude
of determining whether activities by humans or ducks substantially affect commerce,
which may involve an endless number of variables.
348. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a)-(d) (1994). As would be expected, the Corps has
recognized the threat Wilson poses to regulation of isolated wetlands. See EPA, Army
Corps of Engineers Guidance to Field Office on Isolated Waters Issues, Daily Env't Rep.
(BNA) No. 107, at E-5 (June 4, 1998), available in WESTLAW, BNA-ENV database
[hereinafter EPA/Army Corps Guidance]. Accordingly, these agencies have
recommended that, if at possible, jurisdiction over wetlands nationwide should be
premised on provisions of 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a) other than the "other waters" provision
such as subsections (5) and (7), granting jurisdiction over tributaries of navigable waters
and adjacent wetlands respectively. See id. In support of this strategy, the Corps and
EPA cited a "more conclusive body of case law" supporting jurisdiction under these
provisions, as well as, the relative ease of proving jurisdiction over such waters. Id.
Under this directive, the "other waters" provision should reserved for waters that are
truly isolated and intrastate in nature. See id. And in direct response to Wilson, the EPA
and Corps instruct that the "other waters" provision should not be invoked as a basis for
jurisdiction within the Fourth Circuit. See id. Rather, jurisdiction over isolated, intrastate
water bodies, including wetlands, should be premised directly on the Act itself where "(1)
either agency can establish an actual link between the water body and interstate or
foreign commerce, and (2) individually and/or in the aggregate, the use, degradation or
destruction of isolated waters with such a link would have a substantial effect on
interstate or foreign commerce." Id. Thus, according to the EPA and the Corps, it is not
clear how much actual practice will change as opposed to the legal arguments for
extending jurisdiction.
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jurisdiction in individual cases. 9
Given the potential problems with the "other waters" provision,
it is worth considering alternative avenues of jurisdiction over
wetlands such as those at issue in Wilson. In addition to having a
substantial effect on interstate commerce, an activity may be
regulated in order to protect the channels of commerce.35 0 Long
recognized as falling under the commerce power, navigable waters
could be considered channels of interstate commerce.351 Thus,
regulation of activities to protect navigable waters would be proper
under Lopez. The Wilson court openly acknowledged this fact.35
The Corps's regulations extend jurisdiction from this standpoint as
well, defining waters of the United States to include: "[a]ll waters
which are currently used, or were used in the past, or may be
susceptible to use in interstate or foreign commerce"; "[t]ributaries
of waters identified in [paragraphs (a)(1) through (a)(4)]"; and
"[w]etlands adjacent to waters [in paragraphs (a)(1) through
(a)(4)]. '' 353 The Wilson court, however, had difficulties with the
district court's jury instructions, which did not require a "direct or
indirect surface connection to interstate waters. ' 354 Furthermore, the
court pointed out that the wetlands at issue were over six miles from
the Potomac River, over ten miles from the Chesapeake Bay, and
hundreds of yards from the nearest creeks, but it is not clear that the
349. The idea is that a change in language reflects a substantive change, not just a
superficial one.
350. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,558 (1995).
351. See Gibbons v. Ogden 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 22 (1824) ("It is a common principle,
that arms of the sea, including navigable rivers, belong to the sovereign, so far as
navigation is concerned... The United States possess the general power over navigation,
and, of course, ought to control, in general, the use of navigable waters.").
352 See Wilson, 133 F.3d at 256.
353. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a) (1997). Paragraph (1) of § 328.3(a) describes what are
waters essentially navigable in fact. Note that this provision extends jurisdiction upon
potential use of the adjacent wetland, but this reading seems to differ qualitatively from
the "other waters" provision; a body of water that is navigable in fact is still a channel of
commerce whether used or not, whereas, at a certain level, anything could have a
"commercial consequence" when examining an activity for a substantial effect on
interstate commerce. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring). In fact,
"navigable" describes a body of water that is capable of being navigated, but not
necessarily navigated by vessels. Since Lopez permits regulation of not only the channel
of commerce itself but also activities affecting a channel of commerce, the regulation of
tributaries and adjacent wetlands also seems warranted under Lopez.
In response to Wilson, the Corps has recommended that jurisdiction be premised on
the status of a water body as a tributary of or wetland adjacent to navigable waters rather
than the "other waters" provision. See EPA/Army Corps Guidance, supra note 348, at E-
5.
354. Wilson, 133 F.3d at 258.
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waters were not in fact adjacent, only that the jury instruction was too
expansive.3 5- As Judge Payne demonstrated in his dissent, the court
was perhaps a bit uncharitable in its analysis here.35 6  Adjacent
wetlands are one type of water that the Supreme Court has
specifically held to be within the coverage of the Act and the
Commerce Clause. 7 In addition, in upholding jurisdiction of the Act
over adjacent waters, the Supreme Court emphasized the close
hydrological relationship between navigable waters and the adjacent
wetlands and did not focus on necessity of a surface connection.58
Another question is whether the wetlands could have been
considered tributaries of a navigable water. The facts indicated that
there was "a pattern of stream courses" under the vegetation. It is
not clear exactly what constitutes a tributary, and neither the Act nor
the Corps's regulations provide a definition. 39 The Corps, however,
seems to view this as a viable alternative grounds for jurisdiction over
isolated wetlands jurisdiction.60
Finally, Lopez approves of regulation of persons or things used
in interstate commerce. In this case pollution and water could be
considered things in interstate commerce; it could be argued that
water is a commodity, in the general sense of the word, used in
commerce and that pollution is an injurious byproduct of commerce.
Even prior to Jones & Laughlin Steel, the Court had been willing to
extend the commerce power to regulation of injurious articles in
commerce.3 61 Thus, where pollution is discharged into waters that
eventually find their way into other states' waters or any navigable
water, jurisdiction may be appropriate. The Wilson court recognized
this possibility as well, but quickly cautioned that stretching this logic
355. See id. at 257-58.
356. See id. at 266-68 (Payne, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
357. See United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121,133-35 (1985).
358. See id.
359. See 33 U.S.C. § 1362 (1994); 33 C.F.R. § 328.3 (1997); see also United States v.
Eidson, 108 F.3d 1336, 1341-42 (11th Cir. 1997) (noting the fact that the ditch was man-
made and intermittent still did not affect its status as a tributary); Buttrey v. United
States, 573 F. Supp. 283, 287-88 (E.D. La. 1983) (finding a bayou to be a river tributary).
Federal courts have held that regulation of tributaries of navigable waters is appropriate
under the Act. See, e.g., Eidson, 108 F.3d 1336, 1341-42 (11th Cir. 1997); United States v.
Texas Pipe Line Co., 611 F.2d 345, 347 (10th Cir. 1979); United States v. Ashland Oil &
Transp. Co., 504 F.2d 1317,1323-24 (6th Cir. 1974).
360. The Corps has expressed the view that extending jurisdiction over a water body
as a tributary system to traditional navigable waters is preferable to employing the "other
waters" provision in light of Wilson. See EPA/Army Corps Guidance, supra note 348, at
E-5.
361. See, e.g., Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308 (1913); cf. Johnson, supra note 5, at
62-63 (discussing this in terms of protecting channels of commerce).
406 [Vol. 77
1998] INTERSTATE COMMERCE AND WETLANDS 407
too far may implicate the Supreme Court's recent federalism
concerns. 62 It seems that this category of permissible regulation
suffers from the same dilemma facing the "substantially affects"
category of regulation. One of the primary reasons for interpreting
the jurisdiction of the Act broadly is that because water moves in
hydrological cycles and in ecological terms, there is a high degree of
interconnectivity.36 3 Yet using these principles to extend jurisdiction
leads to an obliteration of the limits of federal power under the
Commerce Clause-a result with which a majority of the Supreme
Court clearly is not comfortable.3 6
Wilson is an important decision for both Commerce Clause
jurisprudence and environmental law since it marks one of the first
meaningful ripples emanating from the Lopez decision. 5
Furthermore, the "other waters" provision struck down by the Fourth
Circuit is crucial to the Corps's ability to regulate and protect
wetlands-a matter of national interest. It is not clear how the
Supreme Court will resolve an inevitable challenge to the "other
waters" provision. With the Court's current composition, the key
issue may be how environmental legislation is characterized in terms
of the federal balance of power.
In any event, the "other waters" provision is still potentially
problematic under Lopez even if what it seeks to regulate is a proper
object of Congress's commerce power. If the "other waters"
provision is rejected by the Court, and Congress still desires to
regulate isolated wetlands, the Corps could easily bring the "other
waters" provision into compliance with Lopez with a simple change
in wording. 66 Moreover, many waters covered by the "other waters"
provision could also be regulated under other, constitutionally-sound
parts of § 328.3(a), but the Corps needs to assert jurisdiction on those
grounds and the government must press these arguments in the
federal courts.
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362. See Wilson, 133 F.3d at 256.
363. See United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121,133-35 (1985).
364. See supra notes 192-202 and accompanying text.
365. As opposed to all the fruitless litigation Lopez has spawned.
366. See supra notes 343-49 and accompanying text. While the Corps has publicly
stated that it believes the Wilson case was wrongly decided, it has indicated that a change
in the relevant jurisdictional regulations is on the horizon. See EPA/Army Corps
Guidance, supra note 348, at E-5.
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